# GERMAN NGOS AND POST-EARTHQUAKE RELIEF IN HAITI ANALYZING DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS

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**Erklärung / Declaration**

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## Abstract

This study explored the accountability mechanisms and the degree of transparency of German NGOs for their projects performed in Haiti from 2010 until 2018. While examining to whom, for what, and how German NGOs were accountable during this period, the research investigated German NGOs´ level of aid effectiveness and developmental impacts since Germany was among those parties which ratified the Paris Agreement on aid effectiveness, and German NGOs received significant donations from the German official aid development to implement projects worldwide, especially in Haiti. During the past decade, accountability demands from NGOs have significantly increased due to frequent financial and ethical scandals occurring in the nonprofit sector. Taking an adapted stakeholder theory approach, this study developed an understandable view of the accountability relationship for improving NGOs aid effectiveness and developmental impacts in Haiti. In exploring the accountability procedures of three German NGOs, the study examined the important role public policy can play in strengthening the accountability and transparency practices of German NGOs. The study found that German NGOs are strongly accountable to donors and governments, but weakly accountable to beneficiaries, and German NGOs level of aid effectiveness and developmental impacts are very low in Haiti. The researcher examined how government can influence the accountability relationship of said NGOs by understanding the accountability process and develop policies to defend the beneficiaries who are the NGOs weakest stakeholder. The government could develop enforcement policies by requiring that NGOs regularly provide detailed reports to beneficiaries and publish the same reports sent to government and donors on the NGOs' website. The study gives some policy recommendations to government, donors, and NGOs on how they could improve accountability to beneficiaries so that aid effectiveness and developmental impact could be enhanced.

## Abstrakte

In dieser Arbeit wurden die Rechenschaftspflichtsmechanismen und der Grad der Transparenz deutscher NGOs für ihre Projekte in Haiti von 2010 bis 2018 untersucht. Bei der Untersuchung der Frage, für wen und wie deutsche NROs in dieser Zeit rechenschaftspflichtig waren, wurden die deutschen Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die Wirksamkeit der Hilfe und die Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklung untersucht, da Deutschland das Übereinkommen von Paris über die Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ratifiziert hat und deutsche Nichtregierungsorganisationen erhebliche Spenden von der deutschen Entwicklungshilfe erhalten haben, um Projekte in Haiti weltweit umzusetzen. In den letzten zehn Jahren sind die Anforderungen an die Rechenschaftspflicht von NGOs aufgrund häufiger finanzieller und ethischer Skandale im gemeinnützigen Sektor erheblich gestiegen. Mit einem adaptierten Stakeholder-Theorie-Ansatz entwickelte diese Studie eine verständliche Sicht auf die Verantwortlichkeitsbeziehung zur Verbesserung der Wirksamkeit von Entwicklungshilfe und der Entwicklungswirkungen von NGOs in Haiti. Bei der Untersuchung der Rechenschaftspflicht von drei deutschen NROs, betrachtete die Studie die wichtige Rolle, die die öffentliche Politik bei der Stärkung der Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenzpraktiken deutscher NRO spielen kann. Die Studie fand heraus, dass deutsche NGOs gegenüber Gebern und Regierungen stark rechenschaftspflichtig sind, aber den Begünstigten nur schwach Rechenschaft ablegen. In Haiti sind die Wirksamkeit und die entwicklungspolitischen Auswirkungen der deutschen Nichtregierungsorganisationen sehr niedrig. Der Forscher untersuchte, dass die Regierung die Verantwortlichkeitsbeziehung der NGOs beeinflussen kann, indem er den Rechenschaftsprozess versteht und Strategien entwickelt, um die Begünstigten zu verteidigen, die eigentlich die schwächsten Interessengruppen der NGOs sind. Die Regierung könnte Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen entwickeln, indem sie fordert, dass NROs regelmäßig detaillierte Berichte an die Begünstigten senden und dieselben Berichte veröffentlichen, die der Regierung und den Gebern auf der Website der NROs übermittelt werden. Die Studie enthält einige politische Empfehlungen für Regierungen, Geber und NROs, wie sie die Rechenschaftspflicht

gegenüber den Begünstigten verbessern können, damit die Wirksamkeit der Hilfe und die entwicklungspolitischen Auswirkungen verbessert werden können.

# Table of Contents

## Tables and Figures

### Figures



### Tables

## Acronyms

AA- Federal Foreign Office

ASB- Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund

A4ID- Advocates for International Development

ALNAP- Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action

CPA- Country Programmable Aid

DAC- Development Assistance Committee

DWHH- Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V.

BMF- The Federal Ministry of Finance

BMZ - Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development

BMUB- Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety

GTZ- German Agency for Technical Co-operation

GIZ - German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation

HAP-Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International

ICNL - International Center for Not-for-Profit Law

IATI- International Aid Transparency Initiative

IDRC- International Development Research Centre

IDB- Inter-American Development Bank

IOA Model- Institutional and Organizational Assessment Model

KfW- German government-owned development bank

MI- Malteser International

NGO -Non-Governmental Organization

OECD- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

ODA- Official development assistance

RCT - Randomized Control Trial

UN- United Nations

USI- Understanding Slavery Initiative

USA- United States of America

USAID- United States Agency for International Development

WDB- World Development Bank

# Chapter 1

## 1.1. Introduction

The research examines the accountability methods and level of transparency of the German NGOs for 136 projects undertaken in Haiti from the earthquake in 2010 until 2018. It also studies how policies and interventions can be developed to improve NGOs accountability to beneficiaries to enhance aid effectiveness and developmental impacts in the nonprofit sector. Although demand for accountability from NGOs by donors and governments has considerably increased, NGOs still have not meet the performance expectations. Therefore, governments need to understand the accountability mechanisms and know the critical role they can play to give voice to beneficiaries so that NGOs become more compliant in their developmental impacts and aid effectiveness.

Due to frequent financial and moral scandals occurring within the nonprofit, the governments and donors required regular detailed mandatory reports from NGOs so that they could improve their performance. However, because the beneficiaries, who are one of the most important stakeholders in the nonprofit are neglected, NGOs results are still low. This is because NGOs are more driven to agency theory, meaning that they are more accountable to specific actors (donors and governments) because of the balance of financial and legal power. Hence, NGOs neglect the stakeholder theory that integrates all the relevant actors affected by the NGOs projects, especially the beneficiaries, donors, and governments. This is where the accountability demands from NGOs arise.

Accountability is defined by Edwards and Hulme (as cited in Leen, 2006) *as "the means by which organizations and individuals report to recognized authorities and are held responsible for their actions."* Yuesti, Novitasari & Rustiarini (2016) define accountability as *the procedure to explain one's actions to others*. Cornwall Lucas and Pasteur (as cited in Leen, 2006), points out that accountability is internal and external because NGOs are accountable to themselves and external stakeholders. Ahmed (2004) argues that the increasing demand for accountability from NGOs arises because of funding constraints and media critics. Since NGOs depend mainly on private and public donations, NGOs are under pressure for providing accountability and transparency. NGOs are therefore obliged to perform monitoring activities and evaluations which lead to improve their performance and help them to attract funding because the donors nowadays are more driven to sustainability, measurable, and effective achievements.

This research aims to contribute to and give voice to beneficiaries and improve aid effectiveness and developmental impacts with the following hypothesis**:**

### 1.1.1. Hypothesis

*Accountability to beneficiaries increases aid effectiveness*

The set of research questions to test the hypothesis are below:

### 1.1.2 Research questions

*How are German NGOs accountable to beneficiaries, donors, and governments?*

*For what deliverables are German NGOs accountable?*

*What are German NGOs aid effectiveness and developmental impact in Haiti?*

*How many projects have German NGOs implemented in Haiti to date?*

By addressing these questions, it is expected that this research can lead to improvement of NGOs contributions in Haiti. As the first attempt to examine German NGOs in Haiti, this study can contribute to strengthen NGOs stakeholder relationships and enhance governmental awareness of the beneficiaries who are being neglected. It hopes to inspire donors and governments to develop policies to better deal with NGOs, and that can create a meaningful relationship between NGOs and beneficiaries.

This research is organized in 5 chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of NGOs and the historical context of the study. Chapter 2 presents the literature review and conceptual framework and explains the concepts accountability and transparency, development, and aid effectiveness. In Chapter 3, the primary method used throughout this research is emphasized. Chapter 4 presents the findings followed by the Discussion. In Chapter 5, Conclusion and Policy Recommendations are presented.

### 1.1.3. Background enabling NGOs interventions in Haiti

A seism over 7 on the Richter scale shook the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince and its proximity (Le Soleil, 2010), destroying thousands of buildings and causing more than 300,000 deaths (OECD, 2011). A state of emergency was proclaimed, but chaos reigned at all levels. The government, the health system, and basic needs services were entirely disorganized, especially in Port-au-Prince, a city where over 1 million people lived close to the seism epicenter. Efforts were made to rescue the victims, some of whom were found alive in the rubble of the buildings. But the situation, especially regarding transportation, did not make it easy for Haitians and international aid to arrive in the days that followed. A vital mobilization was done around the world to come to the rescue of the Haitians which is why many NGOs came to Haiti, including German ones. The German Foreign Ministry, following the passage of Hurricane Matthew in 2016, put 2.05 million Euros at the disposal of German NGOs to be able to intervene in Haiti. Transparency is not the strength of NGOs in Haiti because even the state is not able to have the balance sheet of their activities. In meetings, they always divert questions related to accountability, thus evoking a humanitarian actor. Therefore, this paper aims at investigating the work of the German NGOs in Haiti’s post-earthquake state to see to what extent they are in line with the international standards.

The earthquake of January 12, 2010, which devastated Haiti, killing more than 220,000 people and demolishing much of the capital, Port-au-Prince, also provoked an avalanche of international aid. In the 28 months following the earthquake, donors have disbursed almost $6 billion to help the people of Haiti which is the equivalent of $600 per person for a country where the annual per capita income is $670. International aid to Haiti falls into two categories: emergency aid concentrated on humanitarian relief efforts and reconstruction assistance intended to finance reconstruction and long-term development. Humanitarian agencies, NGOs, private contractors, and other non-state service providers received 99% of the total emergency assistance. Less than one percent went to Haitian public institutions. Private companies also benefited greatly from the earthquake in Haiti. Questions were raised about the contracts awarded following the earthquake (Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz, 2012). Less than half of the reports published since the earthquake were carried out by an independent third party and only a little more than half indicate the methodology followed. More than a third of the reports do not contain specific data for projects. The lack of data on budgets or costs is a major cause of concern. Only four reports provided details on how the money was spent: how much did the tents cost, how much money was transferred, what percentage of funds went to logistics and transportation. One document contained a reflection on the quality-price ratio of services and possible alternatives to programs implemented. There is almost no information available on the performance of service providers. Nevertheless, given the persistent weakness of the Haitian government and the model of operation of the international organization, it is likely that NGOs and private operators will continue to dominate the delivery of services in Haiti for some time. Fortunately, there are simple actions to improve accountability over public money spending and private charitable funds to help the people of Haiti. Improved accountability is an essential first step in improving the effectiveness of post-earthquake assistance.

### 1.1.4. A brief history of Haiti

McKey (2016) recalls that Haiti is the first free black republic worldwide. Haiti gained its independence from France on January 1, 1804. However, this independence was only recognized by France in 1825 in exchange of payment of an amount of 150 million gold francs equivalent today to USD $21 billion. In other terms, France made Haiti pay to recognize its independence. Haiti borowed money from the bank of Paris and was only able to finish repaying the amount to France in 1947. The Haitian economy started to decline significantly since then. Currently, using the GDP approach, Haiti is known as the poorest country in the western hemisphere with a GDP of USD $846 per person in 2014. (World Bank, October 2017). Nevertheless, Haiti was the most profitable and wealthiest colony in the world (McKey, 2016). There was not a single colony in the world that was more profitable than Haiti, providing 50% of all the revenue of France, half of the world's sugar, and two-thirds of the world's coffee with the work of 500,000 slaves. Haiti is in the Caribbean, approximately 700 miles from Miami, Florida, United States. In fact, the Haitian people were brought from Africa during the Transatlantic Slave Trade known as triangular trade (between the 15th century and ending during the 19th century) to work hard in America on the plantations. This slave trading system involved forced transport of slaves: from Europe to Africa, then from Africa to the Americas and then from the Americas back to Europe (Understanding Slavery Initiative, 2011). According to the 1685 black code that regulated the slaves' conduct in the French colonies, slaves were considered free goods or just like objects. After much suffering, Haitians revolted during 1791 and 1803, defeated the mighty French Napoleonic army, and declared its independence in 1804.

Between 1501 and 1803 Haiti was colonized by two European countries, France and Spain. The United States of America occupied the land from 1915 until 1934. Haiti has experienced almost all forms of governance, such as empire with Jean Jacques Dessalines, from September 2, 1804 – October 17, 1806; kingdom with Henri Christophe, from February 17, 1807 – March 28, 1811; dictatorship with François Duvalier who ran the country from October 22, 1957 –April 21, 1971, and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier who ran the country from April 22, 1971 – February 7, 1986. The most recent form of government is a democracy beginning in 1987 to present with an elected president, Jovenel Moises (Collectif Haiti de France, 2018).

Haiti as a country has long suffered from natural disasters and catastrophes, ranging from earthquakes, inundations, hurricanes to floods. Haiti already faced several earthquakes at different periods in past centuries which were recorded October 18, 1751, June 3, 1770, May 7, 1842, and the most recent one on January 12, 2010. (Loop Haiti, January 2017). However, the latter earthquake aftermath is the focal point of this thesis.

## 1.2. An Overview about NGOs

According to Lewis (2010), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which are also being called "Voluntary or Charity," "Nonprofit," and "Civil Society" organizations (Riddell 2007), have existed for several centuries. These different designations are cultural and refer to the same kind of organizations. For example, "nonprofit" is usually used in the USA because the profit sector is very dominant in this country. Hence, by designating "nonprofit," American organizations can be more easily exempted from taxes. However, "voluntary or charity" is frequently used in the United Kingdom (UK) because of a long tradition of voluntary work, as well as charity laws, and Christian values in the UK. Whereas, the abbreviation "NGO" which originated on February 27, 1950, when the United Nations (UN) economic and social council passed Resolution 288(X) to recognize non-governmental organizations that had consultative status with the UN (Hall-Jones, 2006), is often used in regard to international and developing countries.

Leen (2006) affirms that NGOs have been there a long time ago and have existed in different forms. The oldest NGO identified is the Anti-Slavery Society founded in 1839. The UN estimated that there were circa 35,000 large scale NGOs worldwide in 2000. Hall-Jones (2006) points out that the number of NGOs started to increase in the late 1900s. The NGO sector was the world's eighth largest economy in 2006. NGOs receive and manage donations estimated at billions of dollars from public and private sectors (Riddell 2007).

NGOs are third sector actors that intervene in many areas to improve social issues around the world and are likely to be very active in disaster relief, humanitarian aids, human rights, international development, etc. To be effective, NGOs articulate their written mission, vision, and values, and many donors fund NGOs because these funders believe in the NGOs' mission (Ebrahim, 2010). NGOs missions are their statement of purpose. Their vision is their goal for the future they need to create, and their values are their beliefs, principles, and guideline concepts (Allison, et al., 2005). Said organizations are best known for two interconnected activities: service delivery to disadvantaged people and policy advocacy and public campaigns towards the transformation of the society (Riddell 2007). For example, it was NGOs that delivered services to people in need during the post-tsunami relief in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, and India in 2004. It was also NGOs that came to help Haitians after the earthquake in 2010 (ANALP, 2011).

Riddell (2007) points out that there are five essential characteristics of NGOs. First, NGOs are formal, meaning that they are institutions. Second, NGOs are private entities because NGOs structure is different from the government and institutionally separate from the latter. Third, NGOs are nonprofit since they are not running a business. Fourth, NGOs are self-governed, meaning that they establish their internal rules. Fifth, NGOs are voluntary because they are open to some forms of voluntary participation, either in managing their activities or doing some works related to their mission and vision.

## 1.3. Research Value

In this literature review, a brief history of Haiti is presented, showing the country's social, political, and economic past and current challenges to demonstrate to what extent this research fits the aftermath of the earthquake that occurred in 2010 in Haiti. Likewise, an overview of NGOs is provided to better comprehend the theory and practices of NGOs and know how to improve partnership relations with the nonprofit sector. Furthermore, a long analysis of accountability and transparency within NGOs is undertaken, explaining how accountability should be conducted within NGOs. Additionally, NGOs' view about development is analyzed to present the nonprofit sector development outcomes, which undoubtedly will inspire both German and Haitian governments in their policy formulation and strategies concerning bilateral or international aid. Furthermore, the relationship between NGOs and the state is examined identifying governmental and cultural differences when it comes to dealing with NGOs. Finally, German-assigned expatriates in Haiti, along with their sense-making and well-being are examined to discover how German employees in Haiti see their organizations and what kind of well-being they enjoy in the foreign country. All this approach has the potential to improve NGOs works in Haiti.

By conducting this research important academic gaps are identified, such as the limited research available on European NGOs working in Haiti though there are many of them working in this country, particularly the German ones. German NGOs are examined not only through their private donations but also through a state cooperation view because German NGOs are in close partnership with the federal state of Germany, specifically with BMZ. The research attempted to fill the gap of the limited research findings on German NGOs in the context of Haiti as the majority of works available by NGOs in Haiti are more focalized on American NGOs. In summary, this research advises international donors and the German government to improve outcomes of their funding in Haiti. It will also serve the Haitian government to know what policies to take to better deal with the international organization. This will lead to transparency and accountability and will play a crucial role in improving development cooperation between Germany and Haiti. It will also strengthen relationships between Haitian and German governments and citizens and build trust and confidence in the programs that are being implemented in Haiti or will be implemented.

# Chapter 2

## Literature Review / Conceptual Framework

Several themes are presented and discussed in this chapter, such as accountability and transparency within NGOs, NGOs and development, the relationship between NGOs and the State, and German assigned expatriates in Haiti, including their sense-making and well-being.

### 2.1. Accountability and Transparency within NGOs

Edwards and Hulme (as cited in Leen, 2006) define accountability *as "the means by which organizations and individuals report to recognized authorities and are held responsible for their actions."* According to Cornwall Lucas and Pasteur (as cited in Leen, 2006), the exercise of accountability requires one to be held responsible by external actors and taking self-responsibility. Hence, accountability is both internal and external. Ahmed (2004) notes that due to funding constraints, media critics and because NGOs depend mostly on donations, there has recently been increasing demands for accountability from these organizations. Hence, NGOs are under pressure for providing accountability and transparency. Therefore, it has become essential for NGOs to conduct monitoring and evaluation activities which lead to improving their performance and help them to attract funding because donors nowadays are more and more driven to sustainability, measurability, and effective achievements. In fact, the necessity of transparency and accountability has increased access to information to evaluate the performance of the NGOs. There is a joint relationship between transparency and accountability because people could only obtain data to assess what NGOs are doing if these organizations are transparent, i.e. display detailed progress and outcomes of their activities. Therefore, NGOs should follow the three facets of accountability, including reporting, involvement, and response (Slim, 2002).

Lloyd (2005) identifies two types of accountability approaches: traditional and stakeholder. The traditional accountability approach involves the delegation of authority to an agent to act in the name of the organization while defending its interest. This delegated agent is accountable to the respective partner and should take into consideration possible sanctions and legal and economic incentives for not being accountable to their associates. This accountability approach is very narrow, and it creates room for corruption because it only allows interactions between official donors and internal boards while neglecting other stakeholders who are affected by the organization’s work (Lloyd, 2005). Whereas, the stakeholder accountability approach is open to anyone who seeks information or is affected by the organization’s policies or actions. Lloyd prefers the stakeholder to the traditional accountability because he argues that it preferably generates mutual accountability, builds trust, demonstrates transparency, and better fits the partnership framework of NGOs. Contrary to a disciplinary tool, the stakeholder approach is a transformative mechanism which facilitates integration of all relevant actors in every stage of the decision-making processes. In this case, accountability is not a threat, but an excellent opportunity for NGOs to show their realizations.

Following the more inclusive accountability approach, Lloyd (2005) determines there are four core dimensions of accountability. First, upward accountability, which is used to be accountable to donors, governments, and foundations. Second, downward accountability which is presented to beneficiaries or clients. Third, inward accountability, which occurred within the organization and among staff. Fourth, horizontal accountability which is used to be accountable to peers working in the same nonprofit sector. However, Naidoo (2003) recognizes that there has not been hitherto any universal framework to generate the highest accountability standards. Therefore, NGOs’ accountability has usually been measured through the mechanism of Lloyd’s four dimensions of accountability mentioned previously, particularly with the “upward accountability.”

In summary, five broad range mechanisms have been used in the accountability processes of NGOs: disclosure statements and reports, evaluations and performance assessments, participation, self-social audits, and self-regulation. Each of these mechanisms is examined according to the: upward, downward, internal, and external accountability dimensions. However, NGOs have practiced ‘upward,’ and ‘external’ accountability to their donors and often neglected ‘downward’ and ‘internal’ mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2003).

Ebrahim (2010) argues that accountability is all about trust. Nonprofit organizations concentrate on accountability once a trust problem emerges or when a scandal occurs in the sector or within their institution. Accountability is brought to the forefront when citizens raise voices to demand accountability and transparency, when donors seek information to verify if their monies are wisely spent, and when NGOs are under legal pressures. This is what Slim (2002) calls the “voice of accountability,” questioning if NGOs speak for the poor, as the poor, or with the poor. However, given the difficulty to be accountable to every single person and for everything, the leadership and management challenge of NGOs is to undertake actions to assign priority among accountability demands and decide to whom and for what they must be accountable (Ebrahim, 2010).

Oakerson (as cited in Ebrahim, 2007) establishes four core components of accountability within the global governance: (1) transparency or the collection of information that is access-opened and available for public appreciation; (2) answerability, which includes the justification and provision of motives for decisions and actions; (3) compliance or the transparent monitoring and evaluation of processes and results; and (4) enforcement, which involves imposing sanctions for not fulfilling answerability, compliance, and transparency requirements. Each of these components is connected to the others, for example, transparency is essential to achieve compliance, and enforcement relies on all the four elements. Accountability depends on the combination of the said four components, but enforcement strengthens it. Accountability is very challenging since NGOs are expected to provide accountability upwardly, downwardly, horizontally, and internally.

Ebrahim (2010) establishes three accountability relationships: “accountability to whom,” “for what,” and “how,” and furthermore categorizes organizations into three types: membership, service-delivery, and policy advocacy. Nevertheless, each type of organization possesses a specific way in deciding to whom to be accountable.

### 2.1.1. Types of Organization and Accountability to Whom?

Membership organizations are managed by and for members and usually have clients who are also members, defending the interest of their members. This type of organization is accountable to their members and clients who are also their members. In summary, these organizations practice two types of accountability, including internal accountability to their members and downward accountability to their clients who are also members. Examples of membership organizations are unions, cooperatives, societies, and clubs, such as the American Association of Retired Persons.

Contrary to the membership organizations where there is significant involvement of members, service-delivery organizations provide service to clients or beneficiaries but are not being managed by beneficiaries and the latter are external to the organization. Hence, the recipients are unable to influence the organization’s decisions. Uphoff (as cited in Ebrahim, 2010) noticed that service-delivery organizations usually provide “take it or leave it offers” to their beneficiaries. That is why service-delivery organizations mostly practice upward accountability. In other words, service-delivery organizations are much more accountable to their donors or their funders than to the beneficiaries. Hence, one of the challenges within the nonprofit sector is to increase the downward accountability, meaning extending accountability to their beneficiaries. According to Ebrahim (2010) Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), which involves developing accountability standards and quality management, assigns priority to accountability to beneficiaries, including disaster survivors. One example of a service delivery organization is USAID, the agency of the US Federal Government which provides civilian international aid and development assistance.

Policy advocacy organizations share some similar characteristics with membership and service-delivery organizations and have at the same time some uniqueness. The similarity that policy advocacy organization share with membership organization is the existence of the membership option. The uniqueness is that their members pay dues and can place them somewhere else if they feel that their interest is not being fulfilled while most of the members do not have direct access to the decision-making process of the organization. In this way, they are like service-delivery organizations, but the difference is that policy advocacy organizations´ accountability mechanisms include lobbying, protest, negotiation, litigation, public event, etc. One example of this organization type is Amnesty International.

### 2.1.2. Accountability for What?

Behn (as cited in Ebrahim, 2010) identifies four categories of "accountability for what" or what NGOs are accountable for, they are: finances, as well as governance, performance, and mission. Firstly, special attention is given to finances due to many financial crises and scandals that occur within the nonprofit sector. A recent case is the British charity organization Oxfam that sexually exploited vulnerable Haitian women after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 in exchange for financial aid and other humanitarian assistance (Washington Post, 2018). That is why public policy is demanding in increase in disclosure of financial transactions to improve transparency and avoid mismanagement.

Secondly, as boards are central for the governance of NGOs, the board is held accountable for conducting internal controls, and legal compliance. The board is also expected to provide accountability for overseeing the financial situation of the organization to provide information on how the organization gets money and how these funds are allocated. More importantly, the board is held accountable for the performance of the organization, including results being achieved, the effective strategy being identified, and social value being created.

Thirdly, NGOs are expected to be accountable for their performance, i.e., for what they are delivering to their members, beneficiaries, or clients. Therefore, to measure their performance, as well as to evaluate and assessing their impact, NGOs apply performance-based tools of accountability such as logical framework analysis, which allows them to measure and verify project progresses, as well as identifying anticipated results and objectives by using a matrix.

Table 1: An adaptation to the logical framework analysis

| Project description | Indicators | Verification sources | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Its overall objective - and desired impact | How the overall objective should be measured, including time, quantity and quality | How, when and by whom the information should be collected | |
| Its purpose – key benefits to the target population | How the purpose should be measured, including time, quantity and quality | How, when, and by whom the benefits to the target population will be conducted | If the goal of the purpose is reached, what assumptions should hold true to achieve the overall objective |
| Its results- clear outcomes or service being delivered by the project | How the results should be measured, including time, quantity, and quality | How, when, and by whom the results will be presented | If the goal of the results is reached, what assumption should hold true to reach the purpose |
| Its activities - tasks that need to be performed to deliver the expected results | | | If activities are entirely reached, what assumption should hold true to achieve the results |

Sources: https://www.slideshare.net/

Funders encourage the reports that contain this form of accountability because it clearly shows outputs and outcomes.

And fourthly, as a mission, what is the purpose for which the organization exists. NGOs are therefore accountable for their mission because they are expected to demonstrate that they do not abandon the reason of their existence. The four components of "accountability for what," which are finances, governance, performance, and mission, are interconnected. For example, beyond its fiduciary authority, the board is also involved in serving the mission of the organization and overseeing its performance. The board and chief executive officers of NGOs work together to outline a strategy to serve the mission of the organization and achieve successful performance.

### 2.1.3. Accountability How?

Ebrahim (2003) summarizes "accountability how" in five mechanisms: reports and disclosure of statements, performance and evaluation assessments, self-regulation, participation, as well as adaptive learning. These mechanisms can be *"processes"* or *"tools"* or both. Accountability tools are strategic devices that are repeatedly used to attain accountability, and the accountability process is a plan or a course of action for achieving specific goals. Reports, as well as disclosure statements, performance and evaluation assessments, are tools; whereas, participation and adaptive learning are processes. However, self-regulation is both a tool and a process. Accountability processes are much broader than accountability tools and less attached to time although accountability processes may use a set of tools to reach accountability. Below is the explanation of the five mechanisms of the "accountability how" principle.

First, reports and disclosure statements, including financial reports and disclosure of transactions, are mostly used by NGOs and are an essential governmental requirement in many countries to exempt nonprofits from taxes. These displays of information facilitate accountability to donors, beneficiaries, and clients as well as members of organizations who seek accountability.

Additionally, this accountability practice also motivates board members in the accomplishment of their roles. However, according to ICNL (as cited in Ebrahim, 2010), legal accountability requirements are also being used by regulators as a mean to fight against NGOs that are challenging them.

Second, performance and evaluation assessments which include a wide range of evaluation tools, as well as performance and impact assessment, strengthen the culture of accountability and transparency within NGO. Parallelly, funders usually conduct external evaluations of NGO activities during the progress or when a project is nearly completed. This additional evaluation aims at measuring the relationship between the objective and achievements of the project so that funders decide to allocate further or cut their actual funding. According to Ebrahim (2010), funders often experience conflict of interest with nonprofits and other stakeholders because of the divergence of preferences concerning for what their partner should be accountable. Should outputs and outcomes or impacts be evaluated, there is often a source of dispute. Tassie, et al. (1998) highlights the case of different conclusions by funders and NGOs with the same program being evaluated.

White (as cited in Ebrahim, 2010) identifies a gold and high standard of evaluation called “randomized controlled trial” or “RCT” whose origin is found in medical research, but is currently being used to evaluate development program impacts where there is a testable and close relationship between cause and effect. Clinton, et al. (as cited in Barahona, 2010) further explains the RCT in a report addressed to the US Government Congressional Research Service. When evaluating program impacts, RCT focuses on expected outcomes. Although it is costly, this evaluation approach contributes significantly to understanding impact in the nonprofit sector. More importantly, the impact is estimated and assessed in relation to non-action. In other terms, RCT examines what situation would exist in the absence of the specific implemented program. Hence, if the situation of a program performed is the same as if any program was performed at all, its impact is negatively estimated, and on the contrary, there is a favorable estimation of impact.

Another evaluation and assessment model called "Institutional and Organizational Assessment Model" (IOA Model) presented by the Inter-American Development Bank and International Development Research Centre (Lusthaus, et.al, 2006). The IOA Model, one of the most effective frameworks for organizational performance assessment, was developed by Universalia, a Canadian management consulting firm. The IOA Model has four factors: motivation, external environment, performance, and capacity of the organization. In the IOA scheme provided below, it is important to note that each of the factors has specific requirements that need to be examined to conduct performance and evaluation assessment. The overall performance of NGOs should be conducted according to their effectiveness in fulfilling mission, as well as efficiency in delivering services, and relevance or ability to meeting the needs and gain the support of priority stakeholders, and finally financial viability or ability to get funding to perform activities while maintaining the inflow of financial resources more significant than the outflow. In other terms, the IOA model sees NGOs performance assessment as multidimensional, therefore, balances effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, and financial viability. The model also requires that organizational performance should be analyzed in relation to the NGO's motivation, capacity, and external environment. This model aims to measure the organizational performance in relation to their mission and purpose. It also tends to understand and take into consideration the influence of external environment on the organization's performance, and identifying the organizational motivation based on its history, as well as examines the capacity of the organization focusing on how the organization uses its resources. According to this model, an organization performs well if the latter balances, efficiency, effectiveness, and relevance while remaining financially workable. Below is a schematic adaptation to the IOA model, containing the four mentioned factors that drive performance.

Figure 1: The IOA model components


Source: Universalia Institutional and Organizational Assessment Model (IOA Model)

Third, self-regulation**,** including codes of conduct and third-party certification, is both a tool and a process performance mechanism which is being practiced by NGOs to increase their outcomes and accountability, sending positive signals to their stakeholders, hence avoiding external critics, meet governmental and donors' requirements, and respond to the increasing demands for accountability. This internal measure intends to wash the image of the nonprofit sector usually subject to scandals, like the case of Oxfam, mentioned earlier. However, whether the self-regulation improves the accountability of nonprofits needs to be experimentally verified (Ebrahim, 2010).

Fourth, participation is a processing mechanism**.** Thus it is different from evaluation and disclosure of reports because it is a continuing activity rather than a periodic approach. In sum, four levels of participation are identified. The first level is the NGO meets members and community leaders to inform them about a planned action being taken. This participation can take the form of meetings, as well as surveys, or a formal discussion on project alternatives. Although people participate in the meeting, only the NGO has the final decision power. A second level is that the community participates in the organization work by contributing to the implementation phase of an actual organization project and its maintenance. NGOs and donors mainly use these two levels of participation. A third participation level is when beneficiaries can negotiate with the organization while criticizing its work in the community, as well as control its activities. The fourth level of participation occurs when citizens are independently involved in activities in their community, i.e., without any organizational or state sponsorship. Participation usually tends to provide downward accountability if there are not some mechanisms to address the inequality of power relations that exist between NGO and community participants.

Recently, many innovations appeared in this field. Participation is combined with performance assessment and evaluation to improve downward accountability. Because of this change, communities now evaluate NGO, and the latter assess funders. For example, in the USA, Center for Effective Philanthropy (as cited in Ebrahim, 2010) has developed grantee perception reports by seeking anonymous information from NGOs about their relationship with their donors. Bonbright, et al. (as cited in Ebrahim 2010) noticed that in the United Kingdom, Keystone Accountability created the *"Comparative Constituency Feedback Device,"* giving data about how NGOs and funders evaluate each other independently. Malena, et al. (as cited in Ebrahim, 2010) noticed that Brazil is the pioneer of participatory budgeting which allows citizens of municipalities to evaluate the work of NGOs and government.

Fifth, adaptive learning is also a process mechanism focusing on the mission of the organization rather than external accountability, although it can improve the latter. Adaptive learning aims at establishing opportunities for critical reflection and analysis within NGOs in the objective of enhancing their activities to achieve their mission. To reach the adaptive learning, an environment of

supportive learning, tangible learning process, and a supportive leadership should exist. The organization should create time for critical reflection and be open to critics and disagreement among members, while building capacity of its members, and encouraging debate and dialogue among them.

Table 2: Summary of the accountability mechanisms and relationships

| **Accountability How?**<br>Tool<br><br>Process | **Accountability to Whom?**<br>upward,<br>downward,<br>internal | **Accountability for What?**<br>finances,<br>governance,<br>Performance<br>Mission | **Inducement**<br>internal<br>external | **Organizational Response**<br>Compliance<br>Strategic |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Disclosures, Reports*<br>*tool* | Upwards to funders and oversight agencies<br>Downwards to a lesser<br>degree to clients or members who read the reports | finances and performance, depending on what is being reported | Legal requirement<br>Tax status<br>Funding requirement<br>(external threat of loss of funding<br>or tax status) | Primarily compliance, with a focus on letter of law and short-term results |
| *Evaluation and Performance Assessment tool* | Upwards to funders<br>Significant potential for downwards from nonprofits to communities and from funders to nonprofits | performance, often short-term outputs but with increasing emphasis on impacts | Funding requirement (external)<br>Potential to become a learning tool (internal) | Primarily compliance at present, with possibilities for longer-term strategic assessments |
| *Self-Regulation tool and process* | To nonprofits themselves, as a sector<br>To donors as a seal of<br>good housekeeping | finances and governance, depending on what the codes or standards emphasize | Erosion of public confidence due to scandals and exaggeration of accomplishment s (external loss of funds;<br>internal loss of reputation) | Strategic if it raises industry standards and enables policy voice<br>Compliance if standards are<br>weak and adopted pro-forma |
| *Participation process* | Downwards from nonprofits to clients and communities<br>Internally to nonprofits themselves<br>Significant potential downwards from funders to<br><br>nonprofits. | depends on the purpose of participation, e.g., whether it is seek input on implementation (performance) or to influence agendas (governance) | Organizational values (internal)<br>Funding requirement (external) | Primarily compliance if participation is limited to consultation and implementation<br>Strategic if it increases power of clients in influencing nonprofit agendas, or increases power of nonprofits in influencing funders |
| *Adaptive Learning process* | To nonprofits themselves<br>Downwards and upwards to stakeholders | mission and performance | Improve performance in order to achieve mission<br>(internal) | Strategic if it focuses attention and resources on how to solve<br>social problems |

Sources : Ebrahim (2010, p. 28)

Gray et al. (2006) point out that accountability can be measured through the transparency of the organization, and whether the funds received are used for its purpose. Kovach et al. (2003) argue that NGOs accountability measurement involves two critical dimensions: control of the members and access to information (online).

### 2.1.4. An effective Transparency mechanism

The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) which was launched in 2008 in Accra and recommend by United Nations, is an effective vehicle to improve transparency of international development aid around the world. Germany is a member of the IATI and donate and pay its membership fee through BMZ. IATI works for the existence of transparent, and useful quality information on development resources that can be used to help achieve sustainable development. The purpose of IATI is to ensure that development and humanitarian data are easily accessible, used and understood. Currently, more than 500 Organization worldwide publish their development spending on IATI, which are open to everyone around the world. More importantly, IATI offers a single format for all organizations to publish their spending. Furthermore, the platform allows that organizations update their data regularly. Additionally, regardless of the type of the development cooperation programs, IATI offers a flexible standard, and Organizations can publish in one central location. Moreover, IATI generates a link to the data released that organizations can share with their stakeholders (IATI, Annual Report, 2016).

### 2.2.1. Accountability of NGOs in Haiti

The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 was terrible. About two hundred and twenty thousand people were killed, three hundred thousand injured, and two million became homeless. The central government of Haiti itself lost 17% of its employees. Adding to this tragedy, 10 months after, a cholera epidemic took hold in the country and killed over 9 thousand people (ANALP, 2011).

According to Bode (2016), it was peacekeepers of the UN who brought cholera to Haiti after the earthquake. As this issue is not the focal point of the thesis, the research work will not elaborate on it.

In response to this calamitous situation, $ 6 billion has been paid out in official aid to help Haiti recover from the destructive earthquake. Additionally, NGOs received around $ 3 billion in donations to implement projects and programs to support the post-earthquake relief and reconstruction (Ramachandran and Walz, 2012). NGOs and private constructors received 99 % of these enormous funds whereas the Haitian government at that time only received 1 percent of the humanitarian aid. Hence, donors and funders channeled their money through NGOs and private constructors rather than to the official Haitian government at that time, President Réne Préval and Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive (2006-2011).

There is a lack of accountability and evaluations of activities and services that NGOs delivered to the Haitian earthquake survivors. Ramachandran and Walz (2012) notice the disappointment of Haitians in observing limited progress, lack of transparency and accountability of NGOs. Klarreich (2012) point out that right after the earthquake, the international response established a logistics base in Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, where all the international NGOs meet to discuss the recovery stages. However, no Haitian NGO was allowed access this base (Joseph, 2015).

Ramachandran and Walz (2012), remark that more than two years after the earthquake, the public reports that NGOs published, including evaluation, performance, annual reports and financial data, are deficient, although there have been thousands of NGOs that performed their activities in the country, including European, American and Caribbean ones (ANALP,2011). A year after the earthquake, Disaster Accountability Project published a report on accountability and transparency of NGOs in Haiti. It found that just eight NGOs out of 196 identified regularly published public reports concerning their activities in Haiti, and around 65% did not have any available reports, instead focused on providing emotional calls or published unreliable case studies on their websites. Furthermore, they never announced their failures, at least in public documents.

Two external organizations: ReliefWeb and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), also combined evaluations and lessons learned reports about NGOs in Haiti. In sum, Ramachandran and Walz (2012), categorized and assessed the only 45 evaluation reports available two years after the earthquake. Their criteria for the meticulous evaluation are: "*independent evaluator, explicit methodology, project information, cost or budget report, discussion on value for money and other options, and recommendations for upcoming operations.*" Said researchers have discovered that less than half of the 45 reports were conducted by an independent evaluator and a little over half provided details on their methodology used, while more than a tierce did not have specific project information. Likewise, no more than four Organizations presented details on how they spent their money, and only one provided any discussions about value for money in presented options. Surprisingly, most of the reports had recommendations although they failed in fulfilling requirements of the other categories. This lack of transparency and accountability creates an atmosphere of frustration among Haitians. The below image found in Ramachandran and Walz (2012) better express the feeling of disappointment of the Haitian people in response to the lack of progress and accountability of NGOs in Haiti.

Figure 2: Haitian frustration against NGOs


Source: Ramachandran and Walz (2012, p.29)

### 2.2.2. Accountability of German NGOs

As far as German NGOs are concerned, OECD (2010) points out that, contrary to many DAC members, Germany does not have general strategies for deal with NGOs. Germany´s rationale for canalizing funds through these Organization is often unclear. Therefore, it is hard to find information on Germany's multilateral institutions initiatives and supports, as well as flows of resources. There has been unclear communication, as well as lack of transparency and accountability on total disbursements, little emphasis on participation and promoting the ownership of Haitians in response planning and little interest in fostering the culture of accountability towards beneficiaries.

### 2.2.3. Assessing Development

Lewis & Kanji (2009) point out that NGOs are critical actors in the international development field. These Organizations have historical profiles in delivering services to vulnerable communities as well as individuals and advocating for policy campaigns. The number of NGOs working in the development field have considerably increased in the last twenty years. That is why NGOs became essential for the theories of development which objective is to comprehend how the process of changes occur in societies (Harriss, n.d.).

The relationship between NGOs and development can be better understood using a historical approach. Since the late 1980s, NGOs have appealed to many actors in the development community for several reasons. Particularly, occidental donors were disappointed by the government to government project-based approach which in many cases lasted longtime and often accompanied with ineffective governmental bureaucracy. These western funders started to consider NGOs as more effective and flexible channel to allocate funds to help people in need, considering that NGOs focused on local implementation and participation.

In this way, Cernea (as cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009) argued that NGOs have certain comparative advantages over the public sector because of many factors, such as NGOs recognize that people are central in development policies. Occidental funders saw in NGOs the potentiality of improving the local participation, closing more to the disadvantaged people than government because governmental agencies faced budget constraint and usually controlled by elites, which prevented them from touching local communities. Moreover, even for some non-occidental donors and governments, NGOs were perceived as cost-effective and efficient because of its very volunteer participants structure. Furthermore, NGOs were regarded as potential innovators to development, and potential creators of progressive and innovative development agendas for gender, environment and empowerment fields. Additionally, right after the cold war, more precisely at the beginning of the 1990s, the new policy agenda of "good governance," advocated by the international donor community, and the latter body viewed development outcomes as a balance between government, market and NGOs. Hence, NGOs had good reputations among development activists.

However, while many people advocate for NGOs, enormous individuals criticize these Organizations. The principal critic is that NGOs undermine the centrality role of the state in developing countries. According to Tvedt (as cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009), NGOs are the facilitator of the changes of the neoliberal policy since NGOs privatize social services through private contracting procedures. Wood (as cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009) severely criticized NGOs for their lack of accountability to citizens. For example, in Bangladesh, all necessary services are under the control of NGOs and the latter are not accountable to the Bangladeshi beneficiaries. NGOs are strongly criticized by Kaldor (2003) for imposing their point of view to the detriment of the people that they are serving. Additionally, these Organizations may also be acting as political opponents in a malignant way to block the route from social movements. Many critics arise against NGOs for their way of intervention in humanitarian aid which is retained of lacks coordination which may lead to duplication of programs and projects. Among the critics include left positions. For example, Tandon (as cited in Lewis & Kanji, 2009) argued that NGOs have contributed to maintain and expand neocolonialism in Africa.

One of the reasons why NGOs that were so attractive and respected, are facing all these critics, it is because of the existence of a wide range of NGO types and roles that are increasing day by day. Another reason why pro and con arguments about NGOs continue to feed the nonprofit literature, it is because of the lack of data concerning their performance and effectiveness in both development and emergency assistance work. In this way Lewis & Kanji, 2009) argue that:

> *"NGOs are no longer what it represented for the development community in the late 1980s…The days when NGOs could simply rely on the 'moral high ground' to give them credibility among other development actors have long since disappeared".*

Hence, the belief in NGOs as development catalyzer is considerably decreasing. Therefore, it becomes a challenge to the non- profit sector to restore the coats of arms.

In this regard, OECD has established a set of development evaluation and assessment criteria to improve development outcomes. It is expected that an evaluation can be conducted for an on-going or completed project, program or policy. The evaluation aimed at determining the pertinence and accomplishment of objectives, efficiency, as well as effectiveness, impact, and sustainability (OECD, 1991). In addition to these evaluation objectives, The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance (1991) include impartiality, independence, credibility, usefulness, the participation of donors and recipients, etc. However, the DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation (2010) require that the evaluator to apply these key dimensions: define a purpose, plan, design, implement, report, and learn from and using evaluation findings.

### 2.2.4. NGOs Development outcomes in Haiti

Many Authors reffer to Haiti as the "NGOs Republic", because around 10 thousand NGOs are actively operating in the country, managing billions of dollars out of the control of Haitian government and tend to replace the Haitian failed and fragile state in many service deliveries due to the weakness of the Haitian governmental institutions (Blake, as cite in Pineda, 2013). Therefore, many Haitian citizens rely on NGOs rather than the state when it comes to service reclamation. Thompson (as cited as cite in Pineda, 2013), points out that the reason why the international corporation has failed in Haiti it is that donors believed that the operation system of Haiti was like other states. NGOs faced poor coordination, inefficiency and poor allocation of aid and achieve a low level of development outcomes due to the incapacity of the government to coordinate their work.

According to Joseph (2015), NGOs do not perform any development work in Haiti. The absence of Haitian in the decision-making process of the function of NGOs in Haiti is critical. The government of Haiti would intervene towards coordinating the NGOs works to improve development, but due to lack of funding, it failed to do so. However, the NGOs have billions of dollars in their account and are therefore more powerful than the Haitian government. NGOs have created a parallel state in Haiti where they control and impose their solution approaches which in many cases do not work. The donors have contributed so that NGOs undermine Haitian state because they prefer to channel their donations to NGOs rather than the Haitian state that was already weak before the earthquake. Joseph (2015) insisted that Haitian state could have improved if the donors channeled their funds to the Haitian local public system. NGOs have been acting in Haiti ignoring the history and cultural differences which needed in a local approach to deal with development. Foreign funders trust NGOs more than Haitian government. Money promised to Haitian government was not disbursed, rather NGOs have the privilege to receive the international funds. Joseph (2012) argue that NGOs should integrate the people that they are serving, this could lead to more development because the beneficiaries also can give ideas as they supposed to know their needs. Schuller (as cited in Joseph, 2015) took the example of two Haitian NGOs “Fanm Tet Ansanm” and “Sove Lavi” that are working in Haiti. The first one integrates the community it serves along with its donors. This approach generates good performance and development outcomes. Whereas the second one only focusses on its donors, that is why it promotes things which are not relevant to the beneficiaries. This lack of involvement of the beneficiaries and the local officials in the decision making is subject to several criticisms from different authors. NGOs is seen as both an instrument and promotor of the globalization because they apply the neoliberal policies which require privatization, free market and low import taxes as Jasmin (2015), use the notion of privatization by NGOs. NGOs took advantage of the institutional weakness in Haiti to promote privatization. Oxfam has been accused of promoting privatization in Haiti. 80% of service delivery is under the control of NGOs. Another factor that slows down development is that the NGOs used to hire foreign employees in their decision-making section rather than Haitians (Joseph, 2015). The latter author notices that four years after the earthquake, Haitians stills lived under tents and temporary housing, although NGOs had billions of dollars to change the situation of these people. That is why Ramachandran Walz (2012) asks *“Where Has All the Money Gone?”*.

There is a form of correlation between community participation and development. In this way, Joseph (2014) stated that although most NGOs development outcomes are critical, there are still some "do-gooders" NGOs in Haiti. For example, Partners in Health is accountable to the local community, and promoting sustainable development, and what the local community needs, organizing survey and look for the community feedback on what has been done.  This approach work and have effective results as this Organization can succeed in Haiti. NGOs that had any experience in relief had to adapt to the relief situation after the earthquake. Their immediate relief was seen to be good because NGOs were able to provide food water and shelter, but after the emergency was over, NGOs are ineffective. Joseph (2014) recognized that after the crisis was over, NGOs not only had to deal with development work but with the difficult situation that they created by imposing approach. They create a situation that becomes difficult to manage as there was no Haitian on their decision-making body and they lose the control of the development side because they just don't know the county. Therefore, there is a significant discrepancy between what NGOs believe they are doing in Haiti and what Haitian who experience their work believe these Organization is doing. This invasion of NGOs in Haiti instead of contributing to the needed development of the country, helping to challenge the local economy because NGOs is responsible for the increasing price rent, mainly, and create a job employment system that competes with the local job low capacity. NGOs close shops because more employees attract by their salaries, neglecting the Haitian local salary system.

### 2.3. German NGOs Development Impacts

According to OECD (2010), Germany has established a development cooperation system for more than 50 years to channel its international aid to partner countries. The policy of the development cooperation system aimed mainly at contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as participating in the implementation of the

Millennium Declaration and poverty reduction. Germany used to provide the most considerable multilateral official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and has been one of the most significant bilateral donors in the world for many years. Germany´s country programmable aid in 2008 was USD 4.3 billion, or 39% of its bilateral ODA. Germany has channeled its ODA through a development cooperation system in which its Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is the central actor and responsible for developing cooperation policies and strategies. NGOs and other implementing agencies such as the German organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), federal states, political foundations, as well as churches and scientific and training institutions are in charge for the implementation of BMZ policies and strategies. In this case, German NGOs that are in partnership with BMZ help the federal government to deliver the bilateral cooperation through projects and programs. German bilateral aid focal points are good governance, rural development, education, climate control and sustainable development (Library of Congress, 2015). The development cooperation system of Germany is both broad and complex because it includes 40 different ministers, NGOs, federal states, agencies, etc. (OECD, 2010).

The yearly budget of the development cooperation is part of Germany´s annual federal budget. BMZ is the main stakeholder within the development cooperation system, administering the significant part of the development cooperation budget. The Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), as well as the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety(BMUB), and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) provide a smaller amount of Germany´s Official Development Assistance (ODA). The Federal States, known as "Bundesländer" also contribute to Germany´s ODA. The BMZ budget for bilateral cooperation is assigned to financial cooperation, which is implemented through KfW (German government-owned development bank), and technical cooperation, which is implemented for the most part through GIZ (German Society for International Cooperation). Additionally, funds are channeled through NGOs, as well as churches and political foundations (OECD, 2014).

Between 2005 and 2007, Germany´s ODA annual average amounted to 3.2 billion Euros (Dreher, et.al. 2012). NGOs are significant channel for the German development cooperation system. That is why Germany has channeled 5-6 % of its ODA to NGOs each year (OECD, February, 2010). Germany has three main instruments for its ODA: debt relief, loans as well as technical cooperation. NGOs can receive funds directly through BMZ or via the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ).

Although Germany has channeled 5-6% of its ODA to NGOs yearly, the country does not have a general strategy to deal with these organizations, which problematize the aid effectiveness that Germany is committed to. As it may be seen, BMZ is very important to make German NGOs provide development work as it is the responsible policy developer for the German system of development cooperation. BMZ is also a key donor to German NGOs that have partnership with it. However, due to low political pressure and public demands, the development cooperation system in Germany remain, critic, as it was in 2005 even though OECD recommended to make some reforms in this system because it creates room for ineffectiveness.

The German development cooperation system presents some institutional strengths and many weaknesses. What makes the cooperation development system healthy is the fact that it has its own ministry, i.e., BMZ, and it has its own seat in the cabinet of the federal government, as well as it is in partnership with very experienced Organizations, and has technical expertise. However, what makes this development cooperation system weak is that it is institutionally fragmented. These fragmentated institution may confused German partners, and it is time for BMZ to coordinate the vast range implementing agencies. What weakened this system is the fact that there is a disparity between BMZ, which is centralized and has an oversight function and the partial decentralization of the implementing agencies. Another factor is the lack of German institutional presence in partner countries to overseeing the work of its NGOs. The German Government acknowledges that the fragmentation of the development cooperation system is a kind of constraint to provide aid effectively. That is why it is willing to reform this system. BMZ was recently reorganized in 2010 to improve the development cooperation and focuses on economic development and education.

Killen (2011) points out that due to the lack of progress and effectiveness of aid which is usually encountered in the context of aid assistance, the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness held on 2 March 2005 is to improve development, because a better aid quality usually positively and better influence development outcomes. Generally, Aid effectiveness is seen when NGOs deliver aid while maximizing development impact, and showing high interest for value for money. Aid effectiveness has attracted the attention of many actors that perform in the nonprofit sector because they believe that aid effectiveness can positively influence development worldwide. That is why aid effectiveness agreements have been sponsored by many actors, such as OECD members willing to enhance growth. Germany endorsed the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), that creates room for donors and partner countries to work jointly towards improving development outputs. Concerning these agreements, developing countries establish their own development strategies and the donor countries align behind the developing countries´ objectives and use their local systems. Hence, both donors and partner countries are accountable for development outcomes, providing mutual accountability. Therefore, aid is focused on measurable developments impacts. Germany published a plan of action in 2009 promising to implement the Paris Declaration of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 to improve its aid effectiveness (BMZ, March 2009). The Paris declaration on effectiveness (2005) defined 5 principles of aid effectiveness that supposed to be achieved in 2010: Ownership, alignment, Harmonization, results and mutual accountability. On the other hand, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) proposed four main areas for improvement: Ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results and capacity development (OECD, 2018).

### 2.3.1. NGOs and the State

Campbell (as cited in Hofisi & Hofisi, 2013) argues that there has been a lack of mutual trust between the States and NGOs in Africa, notably because NGOs have been accused by many African states of involving in their internal politics, as well as promoting political interest of their home countries and the agenda of the international community. Simultaneously, NGOs justify their presence in the continent by accusing African governments of involving in corruption, not applying good governance, which according to them obstruct development in the continent. Although the existence of this mistrust relationship between these actors, Campbell believes that only by working together that the African States and NGOs can achieve sustainable development in the continent as the main role of the state embrace the legal foundation as well as the establishment of sound policy environment for NGOs works.

Clark (1993) point out that around the world, NGOs contribute to the development processes of some countries, whereas in many others they play more the role of political opponents. That is why many governments worldwide are exceedingly suspicious of these organizations. Nevertheless, development impact of NGOs is determined by the friendly relationship between them and the state. Generally, State-NGOs relationship is effective when they pursue a common objective. For example, if a government is not committed too much on climate change, so an NGO that work to improve the climate will be provided very difficult working atmosphere. Hence, dialogue and collaboration between the two actors will not be very friendly as they not in the same line and do not have the same course of action. Additionally, the state will be wary of these NGOs that want to improve the situation that the state itself does not care too much about. This is the same thing for NGOs that commit to the different objective than the state, these organizations will be very suspicious of the state because they know they do not share the same objective with the state. When Government has a positive agenda for social works and NGOs are effective, the relationship between NGOs and government is expected to be very collaborative and robust. This can be intensified by mutual respect, as well as the acceptance of one´s autonomy, as well as independence, and the pluralism opinions and positions of the NGOs. Tandon (as cited in Clark, 1993), notices that such relationships are rare even though all the conditions are met because the mutual distrust between these actors is deeply implanted. Fowler (as cited in Clark, 1993) highlights that Governments are afraid that NGOs break down their political power, and NGOs do not trust the motivation of government. Fernandez (as cited in Clark, 1993) remarks that Although this mistrust environment, there are still some strategic NGOs that seek the collaboration of government, believing that being closer to the government may better help them to achieve their expected projects outcomes. However, this closer relationship may increase corruption, decrease financial dependency and reduce independence.

Tandon (as cited in Clark, 1993) identifies some types of relationships between government and NGOs. One type of relationship is when NGOs are in a position of dependent-client vis-a-vis the government. In this form, NGOs used to implement the state-elaborated programs and get funding through the State (which is a kind of dependency of money, as well as ideas and resources from the state). One example of this form includes Tanzania and China. The second form of relationship is adversarial when there is no standard starting points and no wish from the government and NGOs to seek for areas of agreement. One example of this form includes Zaire, Kenya, and Chile. A third and most constructive form of relationship is the collaborationist one; a type of genuine partnership aimed at tackling mutually agreed issues, accompanied with constructive debate on many areas of disagreement. One example of this form includes India, as well as Brazil.

### 2.3.2. The relationship between NGOs and the Haitian State

Ramachandran & Walz (2012) describe the relationship between NGOs and State in Haiti quasi as a master-slave relationship. NGOs have much more funding and capacity than the state, which makes these Organizations become more powerful and therefore can intervene more rapidly than the state, especially in grassroots and remote areas, where Haitian governments fail to address social issues. The weakness of the state has its roots in its weak public institutions, which allow NGOs to control over 80 percent of the service delivery, almost four-fifths of social service, 70 percent of healthcare and 85 percent of the country´s education. Therefore, Haiti is a quasi-private state because the government is out of control of many economic activities in the country, which are being controlled by NGOs and private constructors. Foreign NGOs are so influential in Haiti that local politicians usually seek their support and financial assistance to fund political campaigns. Zanotti (2010) affirms that many NGOs from the United States of America and elsewhere have been allegedly accused of financing political opposition against the ex-president Jean Bertrand Aristide who suffered a coup d'état in 2004 (Zanotti, 2010).

Therefore, some NGOs have more influence in local politics than the local Haitian population itself. The international strategies that promoted the substitution of the Haitian state by NGOs (because they bypassed the Haitian government and funneled 99% of their aid through NGOs and private constructors) after the earthquake have weakened the Haitian public institutions and the Haitian government. Haitian citizen used to look to NGOs rather than their government for essential services. Ramachandran & Walz (2012) highlights that although estimation of 10000 NGOs actively functions in Haiti, only 343 are officially registered with the country´s minister of unification, which show the high degree of weakness of the Haitian government. According to Trenton (2009), the former president of United States, Bill Clinton who also was the special UN envoy for Haiti in 2009 declared that Haiti had the second highest number of NGOs per capita worldwide. Furthermore, programs of NGOs are not usually included in national planning. More surprisingly, the Haitian government has no method for ensuring accountability and poor coordination among NGOs though the latter typically perform the same kind of projects.

### 2.3.3. German NGOs and German State

In Germany, at least the state can register the NGOs, and there is wide range of legal forms that NGOs can take to operate in Germany, NGOs freely choose one of the legal forms that fit their purpose, and this choice may influence their tax status. The German tax law has long established and worked with a broad definition of the term "charity," and the requirements to provide charitable status to NGOs have not been traditionally very restricted. For that reason, efforts are being undertaken, and reforms are being made to improve the prerequisites for granting charitable status to NGOs as this denomination can exempt them from paying particular taxes, such as trade tax, corporate tax, land tax, and value-added taxes. These efforts and reforms are accompanied particularly with the diffusion of the charitable recognition process for organizations, as well as the harmonization of the criteria for tax exemptions, and conditions for decreasing donors' income tax. Therefore, the development and engagement of German NGOs have been particularly incentivized by the German "granting taxes incentives" or the tax exemptions regulation (Gemeinnützigkeit), according to which NGOs with charitable status have the possibilities to benefit from taxes free on their membership fees, donations, grants and heritages (Advocates for international development, idem).

German NGOs are in close relationship with the German state as these Organizations are important stakeholders within the development cooperation system of the country. Therefore, the relationship between German NGOs and the state is harmonious. NGOs are one of the critical partners for the German bilateral aid as they are among the implementing organs for BMZ policies and strategies. Dreher et.al (2012) highlights that between 2005 and 2007, adding to their € 1.1 billion per annum, mobilized from private donations and member contributions, German NGOs received about € 400 Million of the Germany´s ODA. Hence, German NGOs obtained a larger portion of German bilateral aid than other significant agencies involved in technical and financial cooperation in the development cooperation system, such as GTZ and KfW which combined annual aid was only € 930 million in 2005-2007.

### 2.3.4. German Assigned Expatriates in Haiti

Self-Initiated Expatriates (SIEs) seek out international assignments by themselves (Inkson et al., 1997). Self-initiated repatriates (SIRs) are former self-initiated expatriates repatriating on their own charge, i.e., without employer assistance (Tharenou & Caulfield, 2010). According to Andresen & Walther (2012), expatriation experiences tend to modify employee's career capital and habitus. There are two types of expatriates: assigned expatriate (AE) and self-initiated expatriate (SIE) (Andresen, M; Biemann, T; & Pattie, M.W, 2013). AEs differ significantly from SIEs and migrants on four aspects: executing work abroad, mode of employment, initiative and the legal decision of employment (Andresen, M., Bergdolt, F., & Margenfeld, J, 2012). SIEs are a group of people who travel to work overseas on their own initiative, (Lidström & Laiho, 2014), and are divided into two subgroups: Inter and Intra-SIE (Andresen, M., Bergdolt, F., & Margenfeld, J., 2012). As far as relocation is concerned, SIEs usually fund their own relocation (Peltokorpi & Froese, 2012). Contrary to an extensive research available about careers upon repatriation of former AEs or AEs SIRs (Andresen, M; & Wather, M, 2012), there is limited research on SIEs SIRs and their career capital built abroad. So far, there is published research on SIRs from Germany, Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, China, and New Zealand.

### 2.4.1. German sensemaking in Haiti

The origin of the sensemaking concept can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century (Dewey, 1922; James, 1890). Sensemaking only emerged as a specific topic study in the late 1960s

(Garfinkel, 1967). It became popular among researchers who studied how meaning is constructed and transferred (Garfinkel, 1967).  Polanyi (1967) referred to the concept of “sense-giving” and “sense-reading” to describe how people give meaning to speech and make sense of it. Sensemaking significantly affects how assignees construct their identities (Pratt, 2000).

Sensemaking is the procedure through which individuals try to comprehend new, unforeseen, or perplexing events (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Sensemaking has become an essential topic in organizational studies because organizational members use it to give sense to different uncertain events (Brown, 2000; Maitlis, 2005; Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Hence, sensemaking has gained significant role on organizational process (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Sonenshein, 2010), innovation and creativity (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995) and organizational learning (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009; Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Gepart, 1993; Weick, 1993). Additionally, sensemaking can affect organizational decisions and strategic change (Gioia & Thomas, 1996), as well as the way assignees construct their identities (Pratt, 2000).

### 2.4.2. German well-being in Haiti

An expatriate can either be assigned or self-initiated (Andresen, M; Biemann, T; & Pattie, M.W, 2015). Self-initiated expatriates (SIEs) go to work abroad on their own initiative and usually repatriate without any company aid, whereas assigned expatriates (AEs) are sent by their company to work overseas and often have relocation package (Biemann, T., & Andresen, M, 2010). Even though it could be advantageous, working as an expatriate could also be very stressful. Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) is one of the top job stress models (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001). According to Wilmar B. Schaufeli (2017), Job Demands-Resources are linked to ill-health and motivational processes. The latter is connected to well-being and performance.

According to the JD-R model, there are two dimensions of any job: demands and resources. Job demands require many physical and mental efforts which sometimes cause physiological disorders and psychological distresses (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner and Schaufeli, 2001). High job demand creates work over-load, conflicts with others, and job insecurity, whereas job resources help to achieve work goals, reduce job demands, as well as stimulate personal development. Some examples of job resources are support from others, job control and performance feedback (Wilmar B. & Schaufeli (2017). Stress and motivation processes are two basic psychological processes that the JD-R model entails (Bakker, A. B., Demerouti, E., & Verbeke, W., 2004**)**. The stress process is caused by very high job demands (Bakker, Arnold & Demerouti, Evangelia, 2007) which in turn may cause burnout and lead to negative outcomes such as absence due to sickness, poor performance, and low organizational commitment. The motivational process is the result of high job resources (Ployhart, R.E, 2006) which leads to an increase in work engagement and performance, including organizational commitment and employee safety. The JD-R model establishes a balance between any job resources and demands to ensure employees' health, well-being, engagement, and performance. Moreover, it allows one to include all relevant job characteristics, and it is flexible to the needs of any organization and represents a common communication tool for all stakeholders (Wilmar B. & Schaufeli (2017). JD-R is a recent model, and it was first used to understand the cause of burnout (Demerouti et al, 2001). The model was revised and supplemented by Schaufeli and Bakker (2004) to examine positive psychological features at work characterized by vigor dedication and absorption (Schaufeli and Bakker, 2004). Personal resources, which were recently integrated to the JD-R model, help to control and impact's one's environment, having, therefore, a direct influence on well-being (Taris, T.W. & Schaufeli, W.B., 2016). The increase of job and personal resources is important for an organization to avoid ill-health and burnout and increase employee's performance and well-being, which in turn lead to a higher level of productivity.

# Chapter 3

## Methodology

The primary method used throughout this research is the qualitative approach. To have an in-depth understanding where there is limited available literature, Denzin & Lincoln (2008) suggest said method. Likewise, a straightforward language similar to that of Mankiw, N. G. (2006) is used.

In this chapter, themes that were theoretically explained in the literature review are now used to establish methodological frameworks to analyze German NGOs works in Haiti. Recalling these themes: Accountability and Transparency, NGOs and Development, NGOs-State relationship, and Former German assigned expatriates in Haiti. For this research, three German NGOs are selected as a sample; they are: "Welt Hunger Hilfe," "Arbeiter Samariter Bund" and "Malteser International." The reason behind the selection of these three NGOs is that they were the only ones that accepted and promised to give an interview or share some documents concerning their work in Haiti.

### 3.1. Accountability and Transparency

The stakeholder theory which promotes the integration of all relevant actors in the NGOs activities will be used. To examine the accountability of "Welt Hunger Hilfe," "Arbeiter Samariter Bund" and Malteser International in Haiti, Slim´s (2002) three facets of accountability, which include report, involvement, and response will be investigated through the projects that the targeted organizations implemented in Haiti after the earthquake in 2010. Additionally, Lloyd´s (2005) two types of accountability, including traditional and stakeholder accountability will be explored in the overall accountability approach that these NGOs practice in the Haitian context. Recalling the statement of Ebrahim (2010, p.5) : the type of organization guides its accountability recipient, i.e., accountability to members, beneficiaries, clients, donors and other stakeholders. Therefore, the kind of targeted German organizations will be identified through research about their overall work or in semi-structured interviews with their officials or documents shared.

Moreover, Lloyd´s (2005) four core dimensions of accountability that have usually been used to measure NGOs accountability will be applied. Therefore, upward, downward, inward and horizontal accountability (said four core dimensions of accountability) will be investigated either in semi-structural interviews with said NGOs´ officials or from their public accountability data or in shared documents, and from their beneficiaries in Haiti. Furthermore, the accountability relationship of targeted NGOs will be analyzed with the method applied by Ebrahim (2010) to discover to whom said NGOs are accountable. Therefore, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with officials of these NGOs or information will be collected through their public accountability or from shared documents.

Besides, Ebrahim´s (2010) four categories of accountability for what, including finances, governance, performance, and mission will be analyzed to discover for what the targeted NGOs are accountable. Furthermore, Ebrahim´s (2010) five mechanisms of accountability how, including reports and disclosure of statements, performance and evaluation assessments, self-regulation, participation, as well as adaptive learning will be explored either through these NGOs public data or from document shared or from semi-structured interviews with their officials.

As accountability is intimately connected to transparency, the level of German NGOs accountability findings will represent their degree of openness. Reminding that Germany is a member of The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), an active channel where around 655 NGOs (in 2018) publish their spending to improve the transparency of international development aid. Considering Germany´s membership to IATI since 2008 (IAITA, Annual Report 2016), an investigation will be conducted to the online platform of IATI to verify if these German NGOs publish their data there. Finally, Oakerson (as cited in Ebrahim, 2007) four core components of the global governance accountability, including transparency, answerability, compliance, and enforcement will be explored through the target NGOs data or from document shared or semi-structured interviews with their officials.

### 3.1.1. Development Impacts

For a systematic development analysis of the German NGOs´ projects in Haiti after the earthquake of 2010, The DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation (2010) will be applied. Therefore, the DAC standards quality essential dimensions requirements will be taken into high consideration, i.e., defining a purpose, as well as planning, and designing, implementing, and reporting, and learning from and using evaluation findings. Moreover, The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance (1991) will be applied to determine the pertinence and accomplishment of objectives, as well as developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of targeted NGOs projects in Haiti. By evaluating said NGOs projects, the DAC principles of development evaluation will be taken into high consideration, including impartiality, independence, credibility, usefulness, the participation of donors and recipients, etc.

As development is connected to NGO´s performance, the Institutional and Organizational Performance Assessment (IOA model) will be used to evaluate targeted German NGOs performance. The IOA Model is an evaluation and assessment model presented by the Inter-American Development Bank and International Development Research Centre (Lusthaus et al., 2006). The IOA Model contains four factors, including motivation, external environment, performance and capacity of the organization. Each of the elements has requirements that need to be taken into consideration when conducting performance and evaluation assessment. NGOs performance should be evaluated on effectiveness in fulfilling their mission, efficiency in delivering services, ability to meeting the needs and gain the support of priority stakeholders, and finally financial viability. In other words, the IOA model sees NGOs performance assessment as multidimensional, balancing effectiveness, relevance, efficiency, and economic sustainability. Therefore, targeted NGOs effectiveness in serving their mission, efficiency in providing services, ability to satisfy and gain the support of priority stakeholders, and ability to get funding to perform activities will be examined.

### 3.1.2. Aid Effectiveness

Furthermore, the Paris Agreement on Aid effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) which aim to improve development outcomes, and have been endorsed by Germany, will be used as criteria to examine whether targeted German NGOs have maximized developmental impacts through their projects in Haiti. Concerning these agreements, developing countries establish their development strategies and the donor countries align with the developing countries´ objectives and use their local systems. Hence, both donors and partner countries are accountable for development outcomes, providing mutual accountability. Therefore, aid is focused on measurable developments impacts.

In this regard, the German plan of action of 2009 in which Germany promised to implement the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) requirements to improve its aid effectiveness will also be used as criteria. In conducting this analysis, the five principles of aid effectiveness of the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) will be applied. These five principles include ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. Besides, the four main areas for improvement of the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), including ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results and capacity development will be explored. In this case, interviews or documents will be requested from BMZ, (the critical actor within the German development cooperation), GIZ (German implementing agencies), and the Haitian Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, and Haitian beneficiaries.

To conduct the interviews with German NGOs and their Haitian beneficiaries, Joseph´s (2015) Survey Instruments will be applied and own questionnaire. It is a trilingual survey tools (English, French and Haitian Creole) which already been used to interviewing NGOs and beneficiaries in Haiti.

# Chapter 4

## Findings and Discussion

The method proposed was applied. Arbeiter Samariter Bund (ASB) gave a phone interview through its national director in Haiti. Likewise, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (DWHH) granted a skype interview through its national director in Haiti. Unfortunately, Malteser International (MI) did not provide an interview. Instead, the MI communication officer in Germany sent four global annual reports and responded to some questions of the questionnaire in written form per email. Furthermore, ten Haitian beneficiaries of ASB and ten Haitian recipients of DWHH gave phone interviews. Although the Haitian and German governments did not provide an interview, the principal mayors of the Haitian municipalities of Grand-Goâve and Petit-Goâve granted phone interviews. In this chapter, the findings received from the interviews and documents sent by the NGOs are presented below in tables and figures. At the end of this section, the overall main findings are represented in the last three figures, designed according to the information provided by the interviewees and the documents sent by the NGOs.

Table 3: German NGOs´ accountability information for their activities in Haiti

| | ASB | DWHH | MI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Type of organization | Service delivery | Service delivery | Service delivery |
| Number of projects completed in Haiti from 2010 to 2018 | 19 | 97 | 20 |
| Projects | 780 shelters built; 310 schools rebuilt; 17 schools constructed; rehabilitation of 1320m$^2$ of damaged school roofs; 18 km of roads rehabilitated; creation of 17 vegetable gardens in 12 schools; installation of 5 water filtration units; 60 foremen trained; rehabilitation of 1 hospital; 300 schools trained in DDR; 80$ USD monthly cash for 2 months transferred to 200 families; 75 $ USD monthly cash for 3 months transferred to 200 families; medical care provided to 500 injured persons; rehabilitation of existing water system at Canard Market | 47 projects in rural and regional development; 20 projects in emergency operations; 15 projects in other measures including capacity building for DWHH's staff and partners organizations; 14 projects in basic infrastructure; 1 project in civil society empowerment. | Cholera prevention; DRR training and hygiene promotion; rebuilding of schools; vocational training centers; reforestation, Wash, disaster preparedness; emergency relief |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amount received and donors | 10668962 € of which 5846088 € donated by BMZ. The difference is donated by<br>ADH<br>GMF<br>ECHO<br>DIPECHO<br>DB foundation<br>ADH<br>AWO<br>FOND CATALAN<br>Die Johanniter | 75 612 768.32 € of which 23 763 000.19 € DWHH's own funds. The difference is donated by:<br>BMZ<br>EU<br>FIDA<br>WFP<br>Fly and Help<br>FAO<br>Caribbean Development Bank. | 5083684 € donated by:<br>BMZ<br>AA<br>ADH<br>Europe Aid |
| Project locations | Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, Léogâne, Fonds-des-Nègres, Saint-Louis-du-Sud, Saint-Jean-du-Sud and Tiburon, Fond Parisien, Mirebalais, Corail | Les Nippes, Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve | Cité Soleil, Belle-Anse, Port-au-Prince, |
| Accountability to donors | Yes, through reports submitted per email or handed in | Yes, through reports, provided according to the donors' formats | Yes, in different degrees |
| Accountability to municipalities | Yes, through reports submitted per email | Yes, through reports submitted per email and handed in | No |
| Accountability to beneficiaries | Yes, through focus group discussions, site visits, individual interview, and monitoring and evaluation. Reports are not presented to the beneficiaries in these meetings. | Yes, but indirectly via committees. Documents are given to committees, and the latter are transferred the responsibility to | Yes, in different degrees through community-based committees and regular meetings |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | share those to the beneficiaries. | |
| Internal Accountability | Yes | Yes | ? |
| External Accountability | Yes | Yes | No |
| Accountability how | Reports, focus group discussions, site visits, individual interview, monitoring, and evaluation | Reports, transparency, participation promotion, complaint mechanism, learning and continuous improvement, staff competence | Global annual reports |
| Accountability for what | For projects activities | For project activities | For project activities |
| Online access to detailed reports | No | No | No |
| Community participation | Initial assessment or need assessment, participate in project definition and design | Conception, planification, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation | Community-based approach in all phases of project cycle management |
| Social Audit | Yes | Yes | No |
| Project evaluation | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Interview | Yes | Yes | No |

Table 4: German NGOs relationship with German and Haitian Government

| | ASB | DWHH | MI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accountability to the Haitian government and how | Yes, two mandatory reports per year | Yes, compulsory annual reports for each project | Yes, governmental reporting obligations |
| Relationship practice | Certification | Certification | Certification |
| Accountability to the German government and how | Yes, one mandatory report per year | Yes, mandatory reports | Yes, for projects funded by Germany |
| Relationship practice | Resilience learning initiative group | Reports submission | Reports submission |

Table 5: Developmental impact information provided for their projects in Haiti

| | ASB | DWHH | MI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Projects measurable developmental impact | Quantitative impacts are known (426220 direct beneficiaries) Qualitative impacts (not known) | Precarious impacts and success (2,197,345 direct beneficiaries) | Would be a lot of work to enumerate for all projects in output and outcome over the years |

Table 6: Declaration of German NGOs on Aid effectiveness for their projects in Haiti

| | ASB | DWHH | MI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Build Haiti´s capacity development to manage its own future | Do not do enough | Technical capacity building, agricultural and administrative management of civil society. Empower and accompany social organizations | Work with and through national partners with capacity development plans, including community-based work, strengthening local capacities in a variety of sectors |
| Total funding received in donation | 10668962 € | 51849768,13 € | 5083684 € |

Table 7: German and Haitian Governments side

| | |
|---|---|
| Haitian Government gave an interview | No |
| Reason presented | No reason presented |
| German Government gave an interview | No |
| Motives presented | Lack of resources, do not give interviews to students, do not provide interviews for research purpose |

Table 8: Data Haitian municipalities provided

| | |
|---|---|
| German NGOs are accountable to municipalities | ASB and DWHH (Yes), MI (No) |
| Accountability how | Reports handed in |
| The municipalities put the reports online | No |
| Project execution, inauguration, and follow-up | NGOs in collaboration with the municipalities |
| Municipalities participation in the projects | Supervision, priority surveillance, evaluation, follow-up, give own ideas |
| Municipalities are informed of the total funding available for each project and donor | Yes, through a project document sent by the NGOs before the projects start in Petit-Goâve but not always in Grand-Goâve |
| Municipalities receive the same reports as donors | Do not know and never ask |
| Issues | Projects do not often start and finish on time, NGOs budget is not transparent, NGOs do not involve in sustainable developments |
| How one can get access to the reports | Available only in the physical archive of the municipalities |
| Impacts of the projects | Municipalities do not know |
| Municipalities gave interview | Yes |

Table 9: Expression of the 20 Haitian beneficiaries

| | |
|---|---|
| NGOs meet the beneficiaries before the beginning of the projects | Yes |
| NGOs meet the beneficiaries after the implementation of the projects | No |
| Beneficiaries are informed about the total funding available for the projects | No |
| Beneficiaries are informed about the donors for the projects | DWWH (Yes), but ASB (No) |
| Beneficiaries could give their opinions during the project design and implementation | No |
| Beneficiaries received reports | No |
| Beneficiaries participated in Social Audit | No |
| Beneficiaries are satisfied | 50 % satisfied and 50% not satisfied |
| Reasons for not fully satisfied | Houses and shelters are provided without toilets; shelters are too small, temporary shelters become permanent, lack of transparency |
| Take it or leave it offer | Yes |
| Beneficiaries gave interviews | Yes |

From 2013 to 2016, MI received 5083684 € to do projects in Haiti. Here is how MI presented its accountability in 2013 for 1895151 € donated by AA, ADH, BMZ, and EuropeAid.

Fig 3: MI accountability in 2013 for activities conducted in Haiti




Source: MI global annual report 2013, p.22

In 2014, the Accountability was presented for 984,059 € donated by AA, ADH, BMZ, and Europe Aid in the following manner:

Fig 4: MI accountability in 2014 for activities performed in Haiti


Source: MI global annual report 2014, p. 17

However, in 2015, MI presented its accountability for 1205535 € donated by BMZ and Europe Aid in the following lines:

> "*Port-au-Prince: Improving food security, water, sanitation, and hygiene quality, and promoting disaster preparedness; encouragement of sustainable development for vulnerable communities Belle Anse: Helping vulnerable communities to adapt to climate change by protecting natural resources, strengthening livelihoods, and improving water, sanitation, and hygiene quality*." MI global annual report 2016, p. 33

In 2016, MI presented its accountability for 998,939 € donated by BMZ and Europe Aid in this way:

Fig 5: MI accountability in 2016 for works done in Haiti




Source: MI global annual report 2016, p.35

Examples of the outcomes of the German NGOs´ projects in Haiti after the earthquake:

Fig 6: Water purification system ASB installed in Saint-Louis-du-Sud

Source: sent to us by the German Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Figure 7: Shelters ASB provided to beneficiaries in Petit-Goâve

Source: sent to us by Journalist Eugene Raymond

Fig 8: Houses DWHH built in Petit-Goâve for beneficiaries

Source: sent to us by Journalist Eugene Raymond

Figure 9: Water tank DWHH constructed in the department of Nippes

Source: sent to us by the German Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Figure 10: MI emergency relief after the Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in 2016

Source: MI global annual report 2016, p. 34

Figure 11: Accountability to governments, donors, other stakeholders and beneficiaries



Figure 12:  Aid effectiveness German NGOs declared they have in Haiti




Figure 13: Developmental impacts NGOs affirmed they have in Haiti



# Discussion

The type of the three targeted German NGOs is service delivery. So, these organizations were expected to be accountable through the following five accountability mechanisms: reports and disclosure statement, performance assessment and evaluation, participation, self-regulation, and social audit. However, DWHH, ASB, and MI did not display detailed reports and disclosure statements concerning their projects performed in Haiti. MI and DWHH only presented global annual reports, but this kind of report is not done to provide detailed accountability. Instead, it aims to provide an overview of the activities that the organization has performed around the world for a specific year. According to ASB, the report is the property of the donors, so it is the responsibility of the funders to publish it due to confidential agreement with the donors. Since reports and disclosures are external accountability tools, it is safe to say that the targeted NGOs are not sufficiently externally accountable and fully transparent for their projects performed in Haiti because of the inaccessibility to their detailed reports online.

All the German NGOs officials stated that they carried out performance assessments and evaluations for their projects, but none of them provided measurable qualitative impacts for their projects in Haiti. Likewise, none of them talked about self-regulation, and the term social audit did not look familiar to ASB and DWHH because their officials asked about the definition of social audit before even answering yes they practiced it for their projects in Haiti. However, the beneficiaries interviewed argued that they did not know about any social audit organized by these NGOs.

The German NGOs are more accountable upwardly (accountability to donors and governments) than downwardly (accountability to beneficiaries). On the one hand, while donors, governments, and municipalities received regular reports, ASB is accountable to beneficiaries through focus group discussions, site visits, individual interview, monitoring, and evaluation. On the other hand, ASB did not present any report to the beneficiaries during these meetings. Therefore, the recipients were not able to understand the entire projects, including funding available. Furthermore, while reports are directly sent to donors and governments, DWHH choose to be indirectly accountable to the beneficiaries through committees. So, there is no guarantee that these local committees share the (exact) information to the beneficiaries. According to DWHH, sometimes, non-beneficiaries were also members of these committees. The main reason presented by DWHH for not being directly accountable to the beneficiaries is the high cost associated with the significant number of copies the organization would print because in Haiti not all beneficiaries have an email address. According to DWHH, it would be difficult to justify this cost to the donors. Although beneficiaries are not directly treated in the accountability process, DWHH argued that the organization used transparency, participation promotion, complaint mechanism, learning and continuous improvement, and staff competence enhancement for all their projects in Haiti. ASB and DWHH were internally accountable, but this could not be verified for MI as this organization did not mention this in the responses sent. ASB stated that there are reports for internal and external consumption, and MI is accountable to donors, government, and beneficiaries in different degrees. In this case, other research should investigate if donors, governments, and beneficiaries received the same accountability data.

Concerning accountability, which includes finances, governance, performance, and mission, the NGOs in question did not provide any accountability data for their performance, governance, and mission, but only provided financial information. Hence, the targeted German NGOs are not accountable for their performance, mission, and governance. In an interview, the national director of ASB in Haiti declared ASB built and distributed 1,250 shelters to beneficiaries after the earthquake but in the document the director sent to us, it could only verify that it was a total of 780 shelters that were provided to beneficiaries. Therefore, another short interview was conducted with the ASB official, and the same official asked to forget about the 1,250 shelters said in interview, and only used 780 shelters in the analysis.

ASB and DWHH are accountable to the Haitian and German governments through mandatory annual reports. Likewise, they are accountable to donors through reports. However, ASB is accountable to beneficiaries through focus group discussions, site visits, individual interview, monitoring, and evaluation. DWHH is indirectly accountable to beneficiaries through local committees. DWHH used five accountability approaches for their projects in Haiti: transparency, participation promotion, complaint mechanism, learning and continuous improvement, and staff competence enhancement. Each of the targeted NGOs used their own approach to be accountable to the beneficiaries but used the same reporting mechanism to be accountable to donors and governments. Furthermore, relative community participation was found in all the NGOs practices.

Since accountability has been measured in the literature review by transparency, control of members, and access to information (online), it can safely be said that German NGOs are weakly accountable to beneficiaries because beneficiaries are not directly and thoroughly involved in the accountability process, and beneficiaries do not receive relevant information, for example, the total funding available for the projects that were implemented. Likewise, German NGOs are not entirely externally accountable in details for their project in Haiti because none of the NGOs publish online details reports about their projects in Haiti. Furthermore, beneficiaries do not get the same accountability treatment as donors and governments. However, without the beneficiaries the project could not be accomplished, but NGOs deal differently with these stakeholders. Therefore, the beneficiaries become the marginalized group in the accountability process. Likewise, the information concerning the projects that the organizations performed in Haiti is not online. Hence, access to information online about these projects is not available although the organizations in question have been implementing projects in Haiti since 2010. Although DWHH is a member of Transparent Civil Society Initiative, this has not guaranteed that the detailed information about the activities conducted in Haiti is available online.

Depending on the level of the rigidity of municipalities, NGOs act accordingly. The municipality of Petit-Goâve knew more about the projects because of the surveillance and control the mayor put on the NGOs are higher than in Grand-Goâve. The municipality of Grand-Goâve did not have much information about the source of the NGOs funds and the total amount available to execute the projects. The activity of submitting reports marked the relationship between German NGOs and both Haitian and German governments. It is important to note that neither government published the reports of the NGOs online nor granted our interview request. Therefore, Haitian and German government transparency needs to be improved about information that people are looking for concerning the German NGO activities in Haiti.

The ODA funding that BMZ used to donate to the NGOs comes from taxes, and the accountability and transparency for this funding are crucial. OECD already recommended the government of Germany to provide accountability and transparency for the aid funding channeled to NGOs. Although Germany promised to improve the accountability and transparency for the development cooperation system, BMZ, in particular, did not give an interview to help understand the government view about the German NGOs in the Haitian case. ASB declared that it is the responsibility of the donors to publish the reports sent to them, but BMZ as a key donor did not make the reports available online.

BMZ, the principal actor within the German development cooperation system donated millions of Euros to each of the three targeted German NGOs, at the same time BMZ did not show any interest in contributing data, such as sharing the reports that the NGOs sent to BMZ. Instead, BMZ only shared a list of German NGOs acting in Haiti and suggested preferably to talk to the NGOs. But within the developmental cooperation system, BMZ hierarchically is superior to the NGOs because BMZ has the task to develop policies and NGOs as implementing agencies must apply BMZ policies worldwide. The Haitian Government also did not show any interest in contributing to help understand its approach concerning the overall projects of the German NGOs in Haiti. The official responsible for NGOs at the Haitian Ministry of Planning and Cooperation refused categorically to communicate. Hence, there are responsiveness, accountability, and transparency issues. The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation asked us to send an email explaining why we would like to have an interview with the ministry; even three months after sending this email, the ministry never answered. Therefore, the study was unable to explore the governmental views about the projects that German NGOs performed in Haiti from the earthquake in 2010 to date (2018). In 2009, Germany published a plan of operations for implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 to strengthen aid effectiveness. BMZ’s rejection to grant an interview did not allow us to know where Germany stands in the improvement of aid effectiveness, particularly in Haiti.

In the peer review in 2010, OECD had already criticized the German development cooperation system by arguing that Germany put around 6% of its ODA through NGOs but only among the DAC members does not define a strategy for dealing with the German NGOs.  According to OECD (2010), the German development cooperation system presents some institutional strengths and many weaknesses. What makes the cooperation development system healthy is the fact that it has its ministry, i.e., BMZ, and it has its seat in the cabinet of the federal government, as well as it is in partnership with very experienced organizations, and has technical expertise. However, what makes this development cooperation system weak is that it is institutionally fragmented. This fragmented institution may confuse German partners, and it is time for BMZ to coordinate the vast range of implementing agencies. What has weakened this system is the fact that there is a disparity between BMZ, which is centralized and has an oversight function and the partial decentralization of the implementing agencies. Another factor is the lack of German institutional presence in partner countries to oversee the work of its NGOs. BMZ was recently reorganized in 2010 to improve the development cooperation and focuses on economic development and education.

German NGOs are accountable to municipalities through reports, although the municipalities do not put these reports online. Hence, there is a lack of transparency and external accountability from the municipalities' side. The reports that the municipalities received from the NGOs can only be read in the archive of the municipalities. Although we asked the municipalities to send the reports so that the analysis could be more evident, due to the high volume of the reports, the municipalities declined to submit the reports per email. Anyone can make a copy of these reports but needs to go in person to the municipalities to do so. This is not aligned with the transparency and accountability measurement, which is measured by the access to information online. One essential element is that municipalities could give their ideas and participate in all stages of the projects that NGOs performed, from conceptualization, implementation, inauguration, evaluation, and follow-up. This demonstrates that the German NGOs collaborate with the local government. The only issue the municipalities officials declared that the funding available for the projects is not always displayed in the municipality of Grand-Goâve to know, so the budget of the NGOs is not transparent to the municipalities.

There are common issues shared by the municipalities: the projects that the German NGOs performed did not often start and finish on the time schedule, the NGOs budget are not transparent, and the NGOs are not involved in sustainable developments. But municipalities stated that they defined priorities which NGOs should follow in other to operate in their region. So, if NGOs are not involved in sustainable development, the municipalities should share this failure; it is not only the NGOs failure but also the municipalities failure. Nevertheless, the municipalities did not know the impact of the NGOs works in their region. This proves that municipalities should use impact measurement to know what impact NGOs create in the accomplishment of their projects in their region in Haiti. Furthermore, the local governments never explored if NGOs submit to them the same reports as donors. It is crucial to know this because MI declared that they provide accountability to donors, governments, and beneficiaries in different degrees. Furthermore, ASB proclaimed that there is accountability for internal and external consumption. These statements push us to suggest a further study that investigates if NGOs submit the same accountability data to governments, donors, and beneficiaries.

Developmental impact information was challengeable for all three targeted German NGOs. Project developmental impacts of ASB were only measured by the quantity of their 426,220 direct beneficiaries touched, but qualitatively the organization said that they did not know about their developmental impact in Haiti. Moreover, ASB argued that they will develop a tool together with other stakeholders to measure their developmental impact in Haiti. Due to the absence of this tool, ASB said that their developmental impact could only be known in 2020 after the conclusion of the tool that will be developed to measure real impact. In developing this tool, ASB will request more funding from BMZ to do so. In questioning if ASB was not willing to use the existing OECD tools that Germany is committed to, ASB said they want to go higher than OECD that is why ASB wants more donations from BMZ to develop the tool.

DWHH declared that they have precarious impact and success in Haiti because of the insecurity in the country. This precarious impact and success have only been measured by the number of 2,197,345 direct beneficiaries touched. However, on the qualitative impact, no information was given by DWHH. MI did not provide information at all about their developmental implications in Haiti, but MI stated that this would be a lot of work to enumerate for all projects in output and outcome over the years. Hence, MI is not interested in the developmental impact at all. In general, all three targeted German NGOs need to improve their developmental work in Haiti and be able to measure it by international standard tools.

Concerning building Haiti´s capacity development to manage its future, which is one of the OECD requirements to improve aid effectiveness worldwide, ASB declared that they did not do enough to strengthen Haiti´s capacity development, but the reason for not doing enough was not presented. Whereas, DWHH proclaimed that they provided technical capacity building, agricultural and administrative management of civil society, empowerment, and accompaniment of social organizations. MI vaguely responded that they work with and through national partners with capacity development plans, including community-based work, strengthening local capacities in a variety of sectors, but MI did not present even one from this variety of sectors.

Although the NGOs meet the beneficiaries before the beginning of the projects, the organizations did not visit the beneficiaries after the realization of the projects. The beneficiaries complained about this distance between the NGOs and them. Another critical fact is that beneficiaries declared that they were not informed about the total funding available for the projects. Hence, they were unable to calculate the quality of the service delivered by the NGOs because they do not know about the amount of funding available for such projects. Two beneficiaries of DWHH declared that they were informed about the donors of the projects, but never on the financing available. The beneficiaries of ASB did not know about both the donors and total of funding available for the projects. Since the beneficiaries were in a difficult situation, although they had concerns, they did not ask any questions because they were afraid to lose the service that the organization gave them. Furthermore, the beneficiaries could not provide their opinions during the project design and implementation. So, they received it as a take it or leave it offer. The same situation of fear prevented the beneficiaries from giving their views about the projects. Moreover, the beneficiaries declared that they did not receive any report from the NGOs nor were they invited to participate in the social audit. Also, the beneficiaries were 50% satisfied and 50% not satisfied because they declared that ASB and DWHH gave them houses and shelters without toilets, the shelters are too small, the temporary shelters remained permanently, and there was no transparency.

Although ASB and DWHH in an interview claimed that the beneficiaries are their most important stakeholders, the data shared by these NGOs and the information provided by the beneficiaries proved the contrary. The beneficiaries are the marginalized group in this accountability system because they are the weakest. The beneficiaries do not receive reports, are not directly treated, they do not know about the total funding available for the projects, they cannot give their opinion, etc. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries appreciated the help and services of the German NGOs after the earthquake because they were in an emergency, sleeping on the ground and needed urgent external help. This help is very appreciated among the beneficiaries. However, after the emergency was over, the progress result is not significant for them.

# Chapter 5

## Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Studies about international NGOs in Haiti had examined more American organizations. In this regard, this research was the first attempt that explored German NGO activities in Haiti. The historical context of the investigation is situated in the aftermath of the violent earthquake of 2010 that destroyed thousands of buildings and killed over 220,000 people in Haiti. The Haitian state capacity to provide services to its citizen was already weak even before this seism. So, NGOs massive presence with rapid humanitarian aid was very important to address the emergency provoked by the seism.

To deliver the services to the Haitian beneficiaries, NGOs received donations from public and private entities. Billions of dollars were channeled through NGOs worldwide to respond to the urgent situation in Haiti. The German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and other donors together channeled 67.602.414 € (sixty-seven million, six hundred two thousand, four hundred fourteen) to the three targeted German NGOs: Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V (DWHH) and Malteser International (MI), but there were many more German NGOs acting in Haiti after the earthquake. Moreover, the German Foreign Ministry had put 2.05 million Euros at the disposal of the German NGOs to be able to intervene in Haiti after the passage of the destructive Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in 2016.

However, even after the emergency was over, the level of NGOs that publish accountability for the donations received is considerably low. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) found in 2011 that just eight NGOs out of 196 identified published regular reports online about their activities in Haiti. Therefore, the accountability dimension on which this study focused on was crucial to understanding German NGOs transparency in Haiti.

The study found that the targeted German NGOs are service delivery organizations. In total, they implemented 136 projects in Haiti from 2010 to 2018 and used different accountability mechanisms to be accountable to beneficiaries, governments, and donors. The German NGOs are accountable to donors and governments through direct regular detailed reports but are indirectly accountable to beneficiaries via local committees and through focus group discussions, site visits, individual interviews, and monitoring and evaluation. Interestingly, German NGOs do not present reports to the beneficiaries, while all claimed that the recipients are their most important stakeholders. The findings prove to the contrary that beneficiaries are the marginalized stakeholders in the accountability relationship of the NGOs. The recipients were not able to exert any power, but governments and donors did through the establishment of mandatory reports submission policies. Whereas, the beneficiaries were afraid to complain to the NGOs to avoid losing the services. The recipients expressed dissatisfaction. Furthermore, beneficiaries were not informed about the amount of funding available for the projects they benefited from. While some recipients were notified about the source of the NGOs funding none of them were informed about the total funding that NGOs received to perform the activities. Concerning the hypothesis statement, it could not be experimentally verified if accountability to beneficiaries increases aid effectiveness since the accountability to these stakeholders is weak, but the low accountability to beneficiaries might have decreased aid effectiveness. Therefore, further research could investigate if this low accountability level to beneficiaries have negatively influenced the NGOs´ aid effectiveness.

Furthermore, there are heretofore no detailed reports available online for the projects that the German NGOs have performed in Haiti, but only published global annual reports online which are not as detailed as the one sent to governments and donors. These yearly reports only present an overview of the projects undertaken by the NGOs worldwide, which do not allow anyone to go into details for an in-depth analysis. All the three NGOs have a website, but none of them publish detailed reports online about their activities in Haiti.

Therefore, German NGOs are not completely externally accountable. Likewise, they are not accountable for their governance, performance, and mission at least externally because the overview provided in their annual reports only contain financial information. As expected, German NGOs are weakly accountable to beneficiaries. Accountability to beneficiaries could increase aid effectiveness because beneficiaries would know all the details about the projects which they benefit from. Therefore, the recipients would be able to claim and give their opinion from the design to the implementation phase of NGO projects.

The aid effectiveness of German NGOs in Haiti is considerably low, 30% of the German NGOs do not do enough to build Haitian capacity development while 40% are not satisfied with their own job and there is no data available concerning the other 30% of the aid effectiveness. Furthermore, the level of German NGOs developmental impact is also low since the NGOs only knew their quantitative impacts but not their qualitative impacts. Therefore, 60% of the NGOs have only some quantitative data which is insufficient for a complete impact analysis, while 40% of the developmental impact is not available. These findings tell that the aid effectiveness and developmental impacts of German NGOs needs to be improved in Haiti.

As the first attempt to examine German NGOs in Haiti, this study contributes to enhance NGOs stakeholder relationship and increase governmental awareness of the beneficiaries long ago marginalized and neglected. The research showed the relevance of the recipient integration into the nonprofit sector. Therefore, donors and governments can be inspired from this approach to improve aid effectiveness and developmental impacts of NGOs. Thanks to this approach, policies can be developed to promote a healthy relationship between NGOs and beneficiaries. This research also contributes to show that NGOs currently deal with government, donors, and beneficiaries in different degrees. Therefore, the study shows that there is a power relationship in the accountability practice. In another term, NGOs are regularly and adequately accountable to donors and government because of the balance of financial and legal power.

## Limitation of the study

The limitations of the study are found in the fact that the Haitian and German government views about German NGOs activities in Haiti could not be explored due to the rejection of our interview requests by both governments. Furthermore, due to the incapacity to travel to Haiti, the number of beneficiaries that were interviewed from a distance is small (20) as compared to the number of beneficiaries that the NGOs have in Haiti.

## Policy Recommendations for BMZ

Since it is already mandatory that German NGOs be accountable to donors and the German government through direct regular detailed reports, to improve aid effectiveness and developmental impacts, BMZ could develop a policy to make it also become an obligation that German NGOs be accountable to beneficiaries through regular, direct, detailed reports. As the number of beneficiaries is enormous as compared to government and donors, BMZ could consider having the NGOs send regular reports to the beneficiaries via emails or other means adapted to the country's reality. Additionally, BMZ could require German NGOs to create an accountability category on their website for each country in which they performed activities. Under said category, all the detailed reports for all the projects could be published. This would improve German NGOs external accountability.

## German NGOs Executive Boards

As Germany is a member of OECD, rather than developing individual tools to measure their own developmental impacts, NGOs could measure impact through OECD standards or develop tools together with international organizations to avoid being judge and jury at the same time. Moreover, German NGOs executive boards could develop an internal policy that makes it obligatory to the NGOs staff to tell beneficiaries that they have the right to have accountability information access. Furthermore, NGOs executive boards could require that country directors submit same accountability for internal and external consumption. This promotion of access to accountability information could happen during meetings with beneficiaries or at the onset of designing and implementing projects.

### The Haitian Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation

The Haitian government could consider making it an obligation that the NGOs publish the reports submitted to them on their website and require NGOs to submit detailed accountability to the beneficiaries. This would improve aid effectiveness and developmental impacts and increase accountability relationship and allow researchers to understand NGOs works better.

### EU and Other Donors

As NGOs said it is the responsibility of the donors to publish the reports sent to them by the NGOs, EU could develop a policy that makes it an obligation that the reports submitted by the NGOs are published on EU’s website. For example, the details about ECHO and DIPECHO donations to ASB could be found on the EU website. Other donors could do the same by publishing NGOs reports sent to them.

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# Annex

## Appendix A: NGO Survey Instruments

**English Version**

1. What is the mission of your NGO?

2. What services do you provide in the area?

3. What factors entered into your choice of this area?

4. How does this community compare with others in Haiti with regard to its need for services and assistance?

5. What is your ratio of local to foreign employees?

6. Is the local population able to provide input into the decision-making process you use in planning the services you provided?

7. What kind of feedback about your work here, if any, have you received from the local population?

8. Do you have an exit strategy? That is, are you working towards the goal that one day the local population will no longer need you to provide the services you offer here?

9. Do you interact with the local government? If so, in what ways?

10. Does your organization have any evaluation process that allows it to determine whether or not it is succeeding in fulfilling its mission? If so, do local people have the opportunity to participate in that process?

11. Does your organization have a way for donors to check what projects their donations are going to and if those projects are accomplished?

12. When did your organization begin its work in Haiti? And in this specific area?

13. Has the nature of your organization's work here changed since the 2010 Earthquake?

14. Does your organization work collaboratively with other NGOs or the U.N?

**French Version**

1. Quelle est la mission de votre ONG ?

2. Sur quel projet travaillez-vous dans cette section?

3. Quel sont lest facteurs entrer dans votre décision de choisir cette section ?

4. Comment est ce que cette communauté compare avec d'autres concernant le besoin de vos services ?

5. Quel est votre rapport d'employer local a étranger ?

6. Est la population locale en mesure de contribue dans le processus de prise de décision que vous utilisez quand vous planifiez vos services ?

7. Quel type de commentaire recevez-vous de la population locale ?

8. Avez vous une stratégie de sortie ? Travaillez vous pour qu'un jour la population sera capable de prendre soins d'elle même ?

9. Avez vous une relation avec le gouvernement ?

10. Avez vous dans votre organisation un procès d'évaluation pour déterminer si vous étiez en trains d'accomplir votre mission ?

11. Avez vous un moyen ou les bailleur de fond peuvent vérifier sur leurs dons ?

12. Quand avez vous commence a travailler en Haïti ? and dans cette section spécifiquement ?

13. Es ce que la nature de votre organisation a changé après le tremblement de terre ?

14. Travaillez vous avec d'autre ONG ou avec les Nations Unis ?

## Appendix B: Population Survey Instruments

### English Version

1. Do you know what an NGO is?

2. Do you know of these NGO's in your area? (Have a list of NGOs ready)

3. Did you know there were so many NGOs in your area?

4. Have you or anyone you know ever received goods or services from these NGOs?

5. If so, how would you describe the goods or services provided by the NGO?

6. Would you like to see any changes made in the work that NGOs do in your community?

7. Has an NGO ever asked how satisfied you were with the services or goods it was providing?

8. What do you think should be the goal of an NGO working in your community?

9. Should the NGO have helping the community achieve self-sufficiency as a major priority?

**Haitian Creole Version**

1. Eské ou konen kisa on ONG yé ?

2. Eské ou te konen ONG sa yo té nan zone ou an ?

3. Poukisa ou pansé gen tout ONG sa yo ?

4. Eské ou mem ou bien on moun ou konen jam resevwa service nan yon ONG ?

5. Kijan service lan te ye ?

6. Eské ou ta renmem wè changemen nan fason ONG yo travay nan komunoté an ?

7. Eské on ONG janm mandéw si ou té satisfè avek sèvis li ba ou an ?

8. Kisa on pansé bu ONG yo ta suposé yé ? Kisa ou ta vlé yo fè pou komunoté an ?

9. Eské yo te suposé travay on jan pou on jou moun yo ka pran swen tèt yo ou bien govènmen ka pran swen yo ?

## Own questionnaire

## Accountability

1) From the earthquake in 2010 to date, how many projects you already completed in Haiti?
2) To whom, for what and how are you accountable for these projects?
3) Are you accountable to your Haitian beneficiaries, if yes how, and how often?
4) Do you provide online access to information, such as reports for your projects in Haiti?
5) How the communities you serve in Haiti participate in your project implementation?
6) Dou you practice social audit for your projects in Haiti? If yes, how often?
7) Do you and your donors evaluate your projects in Haiti?

## Governmental relationship

8) Are you accountable to both the Haitian and German government? If yes, how?

## Developmental impact

9). What measurable developmental impact your projects have in Haiti?

## Aid effectiveness

10. What have you done to build Haiti´s capacity development and help the country to manage its future?

11. What is the result for each project performed?